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Abstract: 
This study compares both Canadian and Russian domestic Arctic governance systems and 
explores factors that impact Arctic policy making, positing that shared Arctic ambitions 
provide common ground for improved diplomatic relations.  An exploration of theoretical 
context affecting Arctic IR is provided, followed by a historical analysis of both governance 
systems, and then a comparative analysis of the latest Arctic policies of Canada and Russia, set 
against 7 dimensions of human security consideration.  Ultimately, the analysis of Russian and 
Canadian governance, in terms of their latest Arctic policies, puts forward that as changes occur 
more rapidly due to global warming, there will be a greater need to establish improved 
governance frameworks to accommodate new circumpolar changes.  Non-state actors are felt 
to have a stronger influence over Canadian policy, whereas interdepartmental competitiveness 
and jurisdictional overlap is described as encumbering Russian policy.   In terms of economic 
ambitions, legal frameworks, and improved human security provision, there is broad policy 
alignment, however, there are differences in terms of military defence and the proposed scale 
of utilisation of the NSR.  The paper concludes that there is far greater policy alignment than 
there is discordance, and that there is ample scope for the human security progress made in 
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
Few would dispute the increasing significance of the Arctic region in International Relations, 
not only owing to trade routes opening up as a result of global warming,1 but equally due to 
the vested interest powerful state actors have in this emerging source of natural resources.2  
However, from a policy standpoint, even though the circumpolar North has provided a working 
example of how International Relations diplomacy (IR hereafter) can bridge divides between 
historically conflictual relations, there remain challenges between Realist and Liberal 
intergovernmentalist approaches to ensuring continued peace and prosperity in the region, 
which necessitate a more pragmatic road map for future policy cooperation.  Essentially, it is 
a question of suitably incorporating human security concerns into a framework which is 
mutually palatable for state-led, and non-state-led, parties interested in the region’s continued 
development.   
 In recent years, much of the literature on Arctic IR has focussed around the competition 
for dominance over maritime affairs3 and natural resources,4 territorial claims,5 or the impact 
of emerging Russo-Chinese cooperation.  Indeed, the study of the interactions between Realism 
and Liberal Intergovernmentalism has run alongside a broader questioning of the role that 
bilateral and multilateral relations will play in shaping the future of the region,6 and the 
significance that non-state actors such as the Arctic Council will play in further developing 
 
1 George Backus, “Arctic 2030: What Are the Consequences of Climate Change?: The US Response,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 4 (2012): 9–16, doi: 10.1177/0096340212451568. 
2 A. Zabanbark and L. I. Lobkovsky, “Circumpolar Oil-and-Gas-Bearing Basins of the Arctic Part of the North 
American Continent,” Oceanology 55, no. 5 (2015): 750–59, doi: 10.1134/S0001437015050185. 
3 Haig Cholakian, “Arctic Agenda: A Heated Race for Control of the World’s Coldest Waters,” Harvard 
International Review 39, no. 2 (2018): 48–52. 
4 Zabanbark and Lobkovsky, “Circumpolar Oil-and-Gas-Bearing Basins of the Arctic Part of the North 
American Continent.” 
5 Lucas Laursen, “Russian Claim Heats up Battle to Control Arctic Sea Floor,” Science 349, no. 6249 (2015): 
678, doi: 10.1126/science.349.6249.678; Jeffrey J. Smith, “Reach for the Top Canada’s 2019 Extended 
Continental Shelf Claim in the Arctic,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 4, no. 2 (2019): 246–52, 
doi: 10.1163/24519391-00402008. 
6 Ekaterina Ananyeva, “Russia in the Arctic Region: Going Bilateral or Multilateral?,” Journal of Eurasian 




multi-lateral relations between states.7  Yet underpinning this, there are broader human security 
concerns and representational challenges regarding indigenous populations which must be 
addressed, not least how an intergovernmental forum can provide otherwise marginalised 
indigenous populations with a platform to affect policy.8 
 Situations such as the 2014 Crimean Crisis limit relations between Canada and Russia,  
undermining diplomatic relations globally and resulting in diplomatic deterioration which 
subsequently slows progress in the Arctic.  The question becomes, whether stronger systems 
of co-governance can be established, in the face of wider geo-political tensions between Arctic 
nations.  Although there are many factors, this paper will look at how these tensions are shown 
as stemming from Canada and Russia having key differences in their governance structures.  
However, due to the unique nature of the Arctic, there is sufficient common ground, both 
literally and metaphorically, for progress to continue, particularly in terms of Arctic policy 
agendas, which show a region that experiences peace and cooperation. 
 The general features of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Realism as they pertain to 
IR are well documented, and there have been calls from as far back as 2012 for the 
establishment of neutral ground on which to build stronger relations,9 with calls for a human 
security foundation to Canadian policy,10 and for greater regional cooperation on human 
security across the region.11  By the advent of the 2019 revision of Canada’s arctic strategy,12  
Bouffard, Charron and Ferguson had argued for the mutual benefit of improved Russo-
Canadian relations,13 with Sergunin and Konyshev outlining the key actors and decision 
 
7 Andrew Chater, “An Explanation for the Growing Institutional Capacity of the Arctic Council,” The Northern 
Review 48 (2018): 51–80, doi: 10.22584/nr48.2018.003. 
8 Evgeniia Sidorova, “Circumpolar Indigeneity in Canada, Russia, and the United States (Alaska): Do 
Differences Result in Representational Challenges for the Arctic Council?,” Arctic 72, no. 1 (2019): 71–81, doi: 
10.14430/arctic67955. 
9 Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, “The Strategy of Canada in the Arctic and Russia : Is It Possible to 
Find Mutual Understanding?” 8, no. 98 (2012): 4–26. 
10 Wilfrid Greaves, “For Whom, from What?,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy 
Analysis 67, no. 1 (2012): 219–40, doi: 10.1177/002070201206700115. 
11 Heather Exner-Pirot, “Human Security in the Arctic: Foundation of Regional Cooperation,” Working Papers 
on Arctic Security 1, no. January 2012 (2012), doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18371.40480. 
12 Government of Canada, “Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter,” 
Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy, (2019), 1–23. 
13 Jim Bouffard, Troy, Charron, Andrea, Fergusson, “A Tale of Two Russia’s” in Breaking the Ice Curtain? 
Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World, ed. P Whitney Lackenbauer and S 




makers that could practically affect change in Russian Arctic policy making14 and Lagutina 
having summarised their key concepts of both domestic and international priorities.15  Key to 
the debate surrounding Russian policy development, was the question of the approach to 
bilateral or multilateral relations at the state and non-state levels.16 
 Though historically, a considerable amount of research has centered around Americo-
Canadian17 and Sino-Russian18 relations, there is an apparent scarcity of papers analysing 
Canadian and Russian relations directly on the domestic governance level, and how that applies 
to the circumpolar IR.  Given that the majority of the Arctic landmass is Canadian and Russian 
territory, there still appears to be relatively little research cross-analysing their governance 
systems, or hypothesizing how their future relations might develop in light of the apparent 
differences in their governing heritages.  Indeed, the question remains, how might a better 
understanding of these differences in governance approach serve to better inform policy design, 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations both, and diplomatic relations in general? 
 To that end, the aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the Canadian 
and Russian governance systems as they relate to the Arctic, to factor in the often neglected 
human security considerations of indigenous peoples, and argue for an evolution in how both 
nations handle Arctic indigeneity, economic, and environmental issues, as constructive aspects 
of a more holistic approach to governance of the region as a whole.  The objectives behind this 
research are:  Firstly, to detail and highlight Canadian and Russian governance, and Artic 
governance, in terms of human security, liberal intergovernmentalism, and postcolonialism 
approaches.  Secondly, to give a general overview of Canada and Russia’s Arctic governance 
systems, particularly on domestic policies regarding indigenous peoples, the environment and 
 
14 Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev, “Forging Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Actors and Decision-Making,” 
Polar Journal 9, no. 1 (2019): 75–93, doi: 10.1080/2154896X.2019.1618549. 
15 Maria Lagutina, “Russia’s Arctic Policy in the Twenty-First Century: National and International 
Dimensions,” Polar Record 55, no. 6 (2019): 526–27, doi: 10.1017/S0032247419000664. 
16 Ananyeva, “Russia in the Arctic Region: Going Bilateral or Multilateral?” 
17 Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebertb, “Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security,” 
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 3 (2014): 320–33, doi: 10.1080/11926422.2014.977313; Ted L. 
McDorman, “Canada, the United States and International Law of the Sea in the Arctic Ocean,” in Polar Oceans 
Governance in an Era of Environmental Change (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 253–68, doi: 
10.4337/9781781955451.00024. 
18 Michal Lubina, Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful (Leverkusen-
Opladen: Leverkusen-Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2017), doi: 10.3224/84742045; Paul Stronski and 
Nicole Ng, Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the 





economy.  Lastly, Canadian and Russian domestic governance systems on these three criteria 
will be compared (economy, environment, and indigenous peoples) and a comparative analysis 
will be carried out of “Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework” (2019) and Russia’s 
“Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring 
National Security for the Period up to 2035” (2020) in terms of human security’s 7 dimensions. 
This paper identifies the key characteristics of both Canada and Russia’s most recent 
Arctic policies, it details how they differ, and the consequences of those differences, and the 
ways in which they are similar, exploring the implications of those similarities.  Moreover, it 
looks to orient these policy developments within a wider context of seven aspects of human 
security considerations.  It is argued that greater regional autonomy should be afforded the 
circumpolar regions of Canada and Russia, with an attempt being made to mirror more closely 
more progressive approaches to human security.  While the challenges to such an approach are 
many, and vary considerably based on the Canadian governance context as much as the Russian 
(as will be explored in more detail), the resulting benefit to both environmental considerations 
and human security provision would, as will be outlined, potentiate improved bilateral and 
multilateral relations at both the state and non-state levels.   
 The remainder of this paper is divided into the following sections.  In section 3, a 
theoretical framework for Liberal Intergovernmentalism is outlined, along with an analysis of 
the underpinnings of Human Security, and, of particular relevance to the Canadian and Russian 
Arctic situation, an exploration of Colonialism and Post-Colonial theory. 
 Section 4 is comprised of a historical overview of the region, contextualising the history 
of indigenous peoples in the Russian and Canadian Arctic, exploring the environmental 
concerns which disproportionately affect the region, and expounding upon the governance 
system issues facing regional Russo-Canadian cooperation.  Building on this foundation, 
cooperation between Canada and Russia will be chronicled as far back as the Soviet era, 
alongside an exploration of instances of collaboration in scientific research, maritime safety, 
and business ventures, before an analysis will be made of non-state actors which influence 
relations through intergovernmental forums.   
 In sections 5 and 6, the latest Arctic strategies of Canada and Russia will be analysed 
in much greater depth, with 7 dimensions of human security being applied to each approach, 




 Finally, in the conclusion, a more detailed outline of how greater cooperation might be 
achieved will be posited, taking account of the unique challenges and contextual issues outlined 
in the preceding three chapters – ultimately, a call for a thawing in relations will be made, so 
that the interests of the Arctic can be disentangled from the broader international context, with 
a view to providing a model in Arctic IR for how non-Arctic geo-political conflict might be 
reconciled with a more humanistic focus. In spite of the benefits of the Arctic Council as a 
forum for handling current and future governance dilemmas, it is equally beneficial for both 
Canada and Russia to have functioning, well-organised governance systems domestically and 
regionally which extend beyond the Arctic Council.  As a potential source of economic growth 
and strengthened international trade, it is both countries best interest to adapt and be prepared 
for the unique demands of this new theatre of international politics.   
 
2. Research Methodology  
 
2.1 Limitations and Challenges to the Research 
The standout limitations to this thesis concern the process of data collection.  Firstly, not 
reading Russian to an advanced level, the analysis is based on documents written or translated 
into English, which raises questions of translation theory.  Secondly, given the scope of the 
subject matter being covered, and the scale of the issues facing the region, time constraints 
have limited the number of documents sourced and included.  To narrow the focus to something 
slightly more manageable, three areas of governance are focussed on:  the economy, 
environment, and indigenous peoples, in relation only to the latest Artic policies released by 
Canada and Russia.  The timeframe will also be limited to narrow the focus further, from 2009 
to 2020. 
 
2.2 Qualitative Research Design and Case Study 
Comparative analysis and case study techniques will be used for research purposes regarding 
the thesis topic.  Qualitative approaches have defined the strategy of comparative analysis used 




for comparison, units of comparison, and the hypothesis for research.  Through using 
comparative analysis techniques, it is possible to generalize knowledge relating to Arctic 
relations between Canada and Russia’s Arctic governance systems, through Arctic policy 
implementation and comparisons, establishing chains of incremental progress, identifying 
patterns, and then proceeding with further conclusions to explain why they have certain 
differences, similarities, and challenges, based on three theories: Human Security, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, and Post-colonialism.  
The development and analysis of theoretical propositions in section 3, prior to the case 
study research process, is advantageous in progressing the logic of the research design and data 
analysis.  As demonstrated and discussed, the comparative method of Arctic strategy and policy 
is used, and its application to Arctic governance for Canada and Russia has been applied, using 
a theoretical framework for framing an informed outline of theoretical and empirical literature.  
Firstly, the theories outlined in section 3 and the Arctic history overview gathered in section 4 
will be incorporated, while two Arctic policy documents from sections 5 and 6 will be used to 
gauge, in particular, how Canada and Russia advance their national interests and/or common 
objectives.  More specifically, how Canada and Russia pursue those domestic interests on both 
the domestic and international stages will be explored, including their comparative successes 
in promoting their national priorities through their Artic policies and policy agendas. 
Moreover, this case allows for an appraisal of Canada and Russia’s commitment to 
domestic environmental, cultural, and economic leadership, and their cooperative efforts 
intended to serve the whole Arctic community.  Indeed, the Northern Arctic strategies are a 
case in point, chosen because of their current relevance, as they are two of the most up-to-date 
Arctic strategies.  And finally, the analysis of these strategies will be used within the theoretical 
framework underpinning the thesis as a whole. 
Based on Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory assumptions, both the Canadian and 
Russian Arctic policies steer towards cooperation and call for mutually beneficial policy 
outcomes among the Arctic states.  From a postcolonial perspective, Canada and Russia can be 
expected to continue to promote their own economic interests as a priority, yet throughout this 
thesis, it is shown that applying human security’s 7 dimensions comparison is the useful 
method when examining Canada and Russia’s latest Arctic policymaking and agendas.  Also 
reflected in these policy papers, however, is a significant focus on with national interests, 




The fourth chapter will also outline how Canada and Russia’s Arctic governance has 
evolved in their northern territories, particularly concerning the situation of indigenous Arctic 
peoples and the environment.  Historical developments, the evolution of Arctic domestic 
governance, and the contemporary challenges which faces Canada and Russia’s Arctic regions 
will be analysed using digital archives and scholarly journals, looking not only at how these 
comparative cases show a certain post-colonialist narrative which can be seen in Canada and 
Russia’s domestic interests and pursuits, but also why there are remaining challenges both 
federally and regionally. 
 
2.3 Primary Data: Document Analysis  
Document analysis has a tradition within qualitative research, and the analysis will be primarily 
based on governmental documents, policy statements and strategies, so as to portray a more 
encompassing idea of the political situation in the circumpolar north, a detailed blend of 
primary and secondary sources will complement the two core texts that the analysis centres 
around.  Added to this primary research will be various supporting documents relevant to 
Canada’s and Russia’s Arctic sovereignty and northern territories, as well as scientific 
publications and research reports have also been incorporated.   
Using a binary comparison then, which is the comparison of two items/States/cases, 
Canada and Russia’s Arctic governance systems will be compared via two case studies of 
“Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework” (2019) and Russia’s “Strategy for the 
Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for 
the Period up to 2035” (2020).  Three central questions will be addressed as both governance 
systems are compared and contrasted: 1) Why are there pronounced differences, 2) How are 
the similarities significant to the region’s future, and 3) Does either policy meet the 7 
dimensions of Human Security requirements (Economic, Food, Health, Environmental, 
Personal, Community, and Political security)? 
 Aiming to complete an intensive comparison of themes and concepts concerning 
Russian and Canadian Arctic governance, the main qualitative data was sourced primarily from 
government websites and digital archives, speech/conference transcripts, and official party 




the second International Arctic Forum RIA Novosti was of particular use, as were two key 
policy documents, Russia’s Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian 
Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035 (2020) and Canada's 
Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019). 
 Both policy documents were of considerable value to the research, giving insight into 
Canada and Russia’s domestic priorities, as well as intentions, helping to chart a trajectory 
from earlier governmental publications of relevance, including the Human Development 
Report 1994 and The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics.   
 Two units of comparison for political intentions and processes will be used, while also 
including variables to examine particular tendencies by comparing particular historical events 
and activities to understand the logic behind them, as they pertain to present Arctic policies.  
After trying to determine similarities and differences between the item-to-item comparison, an 
attempt will be made to determine what the logical/social laws are which determine why there 
are these particular results are found.  For example, when comparing and contrasting Arctic 
policies in terms of the environment, deductions would be made from a human security and 
post-colonial frame.   When using comparative analysis, it is important to formulate a certain 
hypothesis, and as such, data collection and analysis will formulate a hypothesis which can 
then be divided in several different stages.  Variables will be used, both independent and 
dependent, which relate to the logic behind relations between independent variables, and how 
they influence dependent variables. 
 Several elements of comparison will be used, such as: frame of reference, grounds for 
comparison, organizational scheme, and the linking of units.  Of particular relevance, frame of 
reference research implies taking into account the context in which the objects of analysis are 
compared.  In this case, it is important to consider whether Canadian and Russian Arctic policy 
cases represent the whole that the paper looks to identify, and how specific processes developed 
while examining its logic and social laws.   
 Within the secondary analysis, existing information will be revisited, and reconsidered 
in light of the findings, focusing particularly on the qualitative material, particularly as this can 
offer up useful conclusions to compliment the primary analysis phase’s results, or at the very 
least bring them into question.  As the launch point for the carrying out of this methodology, a 




and reports sourced both from this platform were sourced, along with materials from 
region/topic specific journals, the findings of which, will be presented in the following chapter. 
3. Theoretical Frameworks 
 
What follows in this chapter will outline the theoretical frameworks for the thesis, those of 
Human Security, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and Postcolonialism.  Though the theory gives 
rise to a multiplicity of views on IR and the prospect of future expansions in co-governance 
and cooperation, the principal objective about which this paper will revolve is to take the 
theories as foundations for better explaining state actions and predicting events within the 
region.  While Human Security theory argues that the most crucial threats are environmental, 
socio-economic, and cultural-linguistic, which are pertinent collectively to states, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism holds that, effectively, it is to the mutual benefit of each state’s interests 
that they cooperate through non-state channels alongside more traditional IR means of 
diplomacy.  Underlining this, Postcolonialism theory maintains that there is a negative 
influence still at play in global politics, based around historical dominance of former-colonial 
powers, which is as pervasive as it is systemic, preserving the domineering self-interest of the 
former power over its former subject – a factor which cannot be ignored in any analysis of the 
Artic region. 
 
3.1.1 Human Security Theory 
Tracing its history back to the end of the Cold War,19 to a period in which there was a strong 
push to eliminate both the arms race and the threat of nuclear war, the founders of human 
security took this moment as a catalyst to ask fundamental questions of where the focus of 
security ought to be.  Namely, whether it is the state or the individual that should be prioritised 
when protection is provided through policy, legislation, and the mechanisms of government.20 
 Having undoubtedly reached the end of an era, there was an ideological move away 
from military security as the predominant concern for IR, making way for a dual consideration 
 
19 Exner-Pirot, “Human Security in the Arctic: Foundation of Regional Cooperation,” 2. 




of human security.21  Defined as an approach which focuses on “human development, well-
being, and dignity,”22 one can see within the original human security literature the importance 
of food underscored as essential to community security, as demonstrated in the 1994 UNDP, 
the Human Development Report on New Dimensions on Human Security.23  In essence Paris 
highlights seven core elements of human security: 
“(1) Economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty); (2) food security (e.g., access 
to food); (3) health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from 
diseases); (4) environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as 
environmental pollution and depletion); (5) personal security (e.g., physical safety 
from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, 
suicide, and even traffic accidents); (6) community security (e.g., survival of 
traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these 
groups); and (7) political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and 
freedom from political oppress.”24 
 Of the criticisms of this theory, Paris makes the case that this concept is too broad and 
equally ambiguous, concluding that while human security is a well-meaning set of beliefs 
which have been successfully applied in several cases, the fact that it offers little substantial 
meaning or guidelines for academics and policymakers in the real world is a considerable 
limitation as a concept.25 
 Though it can be argued that such criticisms help to strengthen and make theories more 
concrete as they evolve in a dialectic with their detractors’ counterclaims, the importance of 
human security in the Arctic is evident, with it serving as the very foundation upon which 
regional cooperation and governance has thrived.  Organizations such as the Artic Council 
were created specifically with the protection of human security in mind, not only in terms of 
 
21 Ibid, 5. 
22 Exner-Pirot, “Human Security in the Arctic: Foundation of Regional Cooperation,” 5. 
23 “World Development Report 1994,” United Nations Development Programme, (1994), doi: 10.1596/978-0-
1952-0992-1. 
24 Roland Paris, “Human Security" Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 26, no. 2 (2001): 90, 
www.gpia.info/publications%0Awww.gpia.info. 




environmental protections, but also for societal and cultural survival, centred around 
cooperation between the invested parties for their mutual benefit and safety. 
 Central to this thesis then, will be a comparative and contrastive analysis of Canadian 
and Russian Arctic governance systems, showcasing how human security has always been a 
significant factor in the region, and highlighting how this will continue to be so in the future 
for the development of future governance building. 
 
3.1.2 Human Security: Criticisms  
Further expounding upon the criticisms of human security, an exploration of its being 
categorised as an ineffective and overly-broad concept for the Arctic will follow.  Developing 
this line of argument, Buzan describes human security as a “reductionist, idealistic notion that 
adds little analytical value,”26 while Chandler summarises three main problems with human 
security, summarising them as: 1) over-emphasis on post-Cold War security threats; 2)  placing 
of these threats in the developing world; and 3) utilization of short-term planning for long-term 
strategizing.27  Basically, the unifying theme apparent in the literature is that there is little faith 
that human security can follow through on its promise to transform how we approach and 
practice security.  
 In response to Chandler’s critique, Owen provides a thorough defence of human 
security, asserting that anything determined solely through a lens of military security is 
ultimately flawed.28  Human Security, however, is not a broad or narrow list, but rather is 
defined by threats which genuinely, directly affect people, and is a concept that encompasses 
varied insecurities while narrowing the threats down in a political context, as seen by evidence-
based policymaking processes “narrowing the focus on the list of relevant hazards to regions, 
populations, and states.”29  Therefore, it is implied that human security, as a process to 
 
26 Barry Buzan, “A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value.,” Security Dialogue 35, 
no. 3 (2004): 369. 
27 David Chandler, “Review Essay: Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 
(2008): 427–38, doi: 10.1177/0967010608094037. 
28 Taylor Owen, “The Critique That Doesn’t Bite: A Response to David Chandler’s ‘Human Security: The Dog 
That Didn’t Bark,’” Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (2008): 445–53, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26299803. 
29 Wilfrid Greaves, “For Whom, from What?,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy 




determine actual threats to humans, is a valid and epistemologically sound theory about which 
to develop policy and research.30 
 Concerning the Artic itself, Greaves outlines how there are secondary critiques 
surrounding human security, and it is not  a useful tool for analysis concerning Arctic cultural 
and social contexts.31  Arguably derived from liberal origins, this theoretical focus on the 
individual security places its importance squarely alongside state security.  A case in point 
would be Buzan’s argument that individuals find meaning in relation to their societies, and are 
not so easily catered for in general terms.32 
 That said, as Greaves summarises, people as a whole exist in set “communities and 
economic, social, and political contexts from which their security cannot be readily 
separated.”33  With regard to the second criticism, human security could fall into another tired 
trope of “virtuous imperialism” by an interventionist and hegemonic west.34  Greaves notes 
that such critiques are undermined by their focus on narrow, violence-centric approaches to 
human security rather than a holistic framework.35  
 
3.1.3 Human Security: Canada 
At the vanguard of the international community, Canada has become a leader in using human 
security as a unifying framework for security policies, championing the principles outlined in 
the Canadian Northern Dimension of Foreign Policy, those of sustainable development, the 
participation of indigenous peoples, environmental protection, and cultural diversity.36  In the 
post-cold war era, many have alluded to human security being a “central pillar, political 
leitmotif and ethical guide” in global Canadian affairs.37  Noted as having made substantial 
efforts to prioritise the human security agenda on matters of circumpolar significance, it is 
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unsurprising that Canada took the lead in the formation of the Arctic Council back in 1996, as 
much to improve its own domestic situation around satisfying northern indigenous groups, as 
to put itself at the centre of the stage geopolitically.38   
 Although Canada’s human security agenda is broadly regarded as a positive, there are 
several challenges in terms of how Canada has defined and used human security.  Mainly, the 
issue is summarized as stemming from the Canadian method being concentrated largely around 
the prevention of violence towards humans.  Essentially, Greaves argues that in the process of 
ignoring the socioeconomic and inter-subjective aspects of human wellbeing, the Canadian 
method is missing the main point and core of holistic human security.  The problem is placing 
the central importance on the role of violence, which is a tool that allows Canada to privilege 
the state and its institutions over the individuals at the analytical centre of human security, or 
to put it more conceptually, it ultimately “retains a state-centrism and conceptual narrowness 
that undermines employing people as the referent objects of security analysis.”39 
 Concerning Human Security in Canadian history, one of the most famous Canadian 
participants is Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's minister of foreign affairs and international trade 
from 1996-2000. Although he claimed “sustainable human security” was vital in terms 
acknowledging violent and nonviolent threats concerning the holistic human security definition 
defined by the UNDP, Axworthy remained at arm’s length.40  By indicating that “Canada has 
both the capacity and the credibility to play a leadership role in support of human security,” 
and identifying four key policy areas: peacebuilding, anti-personnel landmines, protecting the 
rights of children, and promoting an international system of rules-based trade41, the foundation 
was established for much of the developments that followed.  However, one key obstacle is 
that the Canadian approach is based on an “inside/outside distinction” and has failed in certain 
cases to take account of global neoliberalism as a potential systemic issue that could perpetuate 
human insecurity42.  
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 One means of mitigating such shortcomings, it is argued, is the adoption of the holistic 
approach to human security, particularly concerning indigenous peoples and Arctic 
populations, including them in political, economic, and social frameworks.  Notably, there are 
blockages at the federal level, as indigenous peoples lack legal and representative status, as 
The Indian Act43 and similar legal frameworks only served to mould a tenuous relationship 
between the federal government and First Nations, Metis, and Inuit peoples, that has still 
“marginalized and infantilized aboriginals, making so-called Indians a special class of persons, 
legal dependents on the crown, [and] children in the eyes of the law.”44  Human insecurity of 
this kind could be said to be a symptom of the constitutional and legal frameworks imposed by 
the state, and the evidence is seen in the poor conditions at present in these communities.  
Regarding the quality of life in Canada’s North, there are statistically significant 
differences between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples which became more noticeable as 
time progressed.   Summarizing the main findings of the CWB index, factoring in the First 
Nations, Inuit, and non-Aboriginal communities, spanning a period from 1981 to 2006 it is 
clear that:45 
• First Nation and Inuit communities are both 20 and 15 points lower than non-
Aboriginal communities respectively. 
• Of the 100 lowest scoring Canadian communities on the index, 96 were First 
Nations, yet only one First Nations community ranked among the highest 100 in 
2006.  
• Of the lowest scoring 500 communities, 34 were Inuit, yet no Inuit communities 
ranked in the highest scoring 500.  
• While First Nation, Inuit, and aboriginal communities saw scores gradually rise 
from 1981 to 2006, the gap between First Nation/Inuit and non-Aboriginal 
communities actually decreased slightly in the earlier part of this period, before 
widening again between 2001 and 2006. 
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3.1.4 Human Security: Russia 
In terms of human security, official documents and statements indicate that the Russian Arctic 
is predominantly geared towards national, economic, and military security.46  The strongest 
player in the Arctic, Russia can be said to have the most at stake economically in the region, 
and therefore be the most invested in the region being stable and fertile.47  As with the 
conditions in many Arctic areas, the Russian Arctic experiences difficult socio-economic 
problems owing to a lack of human security considerations in the region, which brings a lot of 
insecurity and instability to communities residing there.  Facing a host of issues, the indigenous 
peoples of Russia’s north have to contend with economic conditions which clash with 
traditional ways of living, rising rates of disease and infant mortality, and alcoholism, none of 
which is represented in the official narrative of national security in the region.48 
 A case of particular note would be the environmental situation in the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation (AZRF hereafter), where 27 scientists have listed impact zones where 
pollution has resulted in health deterioration within domestic Arctic circle regions, as fallout 
from industrial and military activities.49  Of the areas most affected in the AZRF, up to 15% of 
the Murmansk Region is estimated to be contaminated,50 and the Barents Sea area also 
possesses the largest amount of military and civilian in the world.  Understandably, it cannot 
be overstated that the AZRF is at considerable risk from nuclear contamination, with “tens of 
thousands of cubic meters of highly radioactive nuclear waste have collected there.”51 
 Historically, from the years 1964 to 1991, radioactive waste was dumped in the Barents 
and Kara seas, and the figures of radioactive waste amounted to 319,000 curie in the Barents 
Sea and 2,419,000 curie in the Kara Sea.52   It was then in 2017 when the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment proposed an agenda to clean up the garbage in the Arctic thus, 
since 2010 the AZRF has been “regularly cleaned, as a result of which in 2012 the territory of 
Alexandra Land, which is part of the Franz Josef Land archipelago, was completely cleaned 
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up; for the period from 2012 to 2015, 40 thousand tons of waste were disposed of in the Arctic 
and 200 hectares of land were reclaimed.”53  Special environmental zones have been set up, 
natural environment areas have been reclaimed, and pollution monitoring systems put in place, 
alongside which a designated conservation area has been set up around the Novaya Zemlya 
archipelago and adjoining islands.54  More precisely, there are 164 areas protected at the federal 
level, including 12 state reserves, 8 nature reserves, 5 national parks and a botanical garden55 
at present.  Stakeholder participation has increased across the region and projects have been 
implemented to reverse the legacy of environmental damage from the 20th Century,56 with the 
Russian Arctic aiming to evolve from a ‘resource base’ into a zone of sustainable 
development.57 
 At the second International Arctic Forum in RIA Novosti (September 23, 2011), Putin 
gives some insight about the focus of the Arctic as can be seen from this exert from his address: 
“Developing modern infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route is a major objective.  We are 
launching a comprehensive transport project designed to ensure the dynamic development and 
exploration of our northern territories, resolve vital economic and social challenges and create 
new production lines and jobs.”58 
 
3.1.5 Human Security in the Arctic 
An important element to consider when talking about the Arctic is that the political objectives 
in the Arctic are traditionally of an economic nature (such as: controlling shipping lanes, oil 
and gas exploitation).  Because of this, the economic aspect a military conflict would obstruct 
instead of furthering political objectives.59  Michael Byers confirms this idea in an interview 
“No Militarization of the Arctic” (2013) saying: 
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“First of all, Russia can't afford to militarize the Arctic. The expense would be 
prohibitive. The country also needs Western capital and technology to develop 
its oil and gas resources. And it's also a member of the World Trade 
Organization. We're not talking about a Cold War here. When we see these 
statements from Canadian and Russian leaders, they're driven mostly by 
domestic politics. The reality is that Canada and Russia are integrated in a 
global economy.”60 
 As many Arctic authorities have illustrated, due to the investment, technology, and time 
it would take, it is in the interests of the Arctic Eight to guarantee the region is  “stable and that 
the governance framework is as predictable as possible.”61 
 Therefore, this paper will argue that the focus on traditional security issues in the Arctic 
has become an obstacle regarding crucial resources and even deviates attention away from the 
human security issues that afflict the Arctic such as the environmental, economic and cultural 
nature.  The analysis of Russian and Canadian governance in terms of Arctic policies will be 
looked at by these human security objectives: protection of the environment; sustainable 
economic promotion; and the preservation of cultural practices of the indigenous inhabitants 
of the Arctic.  As the changes occur more rapidly due to global warming there will be a great 
need to establish a governance framework to deal with these changes, as it would be difficult 
during the chaotic climate. 
 
3.2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory 
Central to the theory surrounding the study of regional integration, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI hereafter) evolved out of mid-1960s traditional 
intergovernmentalism, first outlined by Hoffmann in 1966.62  Emerging in response to 
neofunctionalism, a previously dominant regional integration theory, in many ways 
intergovernmentalism proved to be a successful approach for better explaining the processes 
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behind the integration of states in supranational organizations, and the decision making in 
international bodies generally.63  LI, however, is a revised framework of intergovernmentalism, 
which aims at explaining integration by state preferences as being driven by issue-specific 
preference functions about how to manage globalization.64  
 To begin with, the key assumptions and features of LI will be highlighted, and then the 
theory will be used to examine important historical and relevant Canadian and Russian Arctic 
governance systems.  By way of a conclusion, an analysis of the criticisms against LI will be 
outlined, detailing the theories of particular usefulness in relation to the purpose of this paper. 
 In essence, LI provides a theory of intergovernmental decision making which accounts 
for a certain level of anarchy within IR.  Two basic assumptions are made about international 
politics within LI: One, that states are actors, depicted as moving to achieve their goals through 
intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining rather than a central authority making and 
enforcing political decisions.65  Two, that states are rational.  Rationalism is an 
individualist/agency assumption, by which actors navigate various options of courses of action 
and chose one that maximizes or satisfies their benefit under the given circumstances.66  In this 
sense, agreement to cooperate or establish international institutions is therefore explained as a 
collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental 
negotiations.67 
 In keeping with LI theory, decisions to cooperate internationally can be seen as a three-
stage framework with a distinct theory for each step: a ‘liberal’ or societal national preference 
formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations, and a functional theory of 
institutional choice.68  For example, EU integration can best be understood as a series of 
rational choices made by national leaders. 
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 Indeed, LI is built around the idea that self-governing rational individuals and private 
institutions with varied interests are the basis for actors in international politics69.  The sum of 
their mixed interests is in continuous competition for influence over the state, and these 
dominant actors on the domestic stage are thusly allowed to lobby and influence the discourse 
of governments and global interactions.70   In order to predict and comprehend state actions 
and positions of power, it is deemed vital to analyze what purpose and goal each state wants, 
and those interests which are domestic in origin, which also makes LI unique versus other 
schools of thought that surmise state preferences as being exclusively set.71  As such, 
Moravcsik promotes an analytical approach that systematically provides “multi-causal 
explanations, rooted in a thorough understanding of state-society relations, interstate 
bargaining and institutions.”72 
 
3.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Criticisms 
In looking to understand the theory more completely, there are three main criticisms of LI 
which need to be addressed.  The heart of the critical argument is that LI is said to exaggerate 
when it comes to the detailing of broader trends in regional integration.73  Firstly, rational 
institutionalists imply that LI is unable to provide sufficient explanations for everyday decision 
making, particularly in its focus on treaty amendments which amount to only a small portion 
of EU policy making.  Secondly, another potential weakness in LI, historical institutionalists 
argue, is due to the overlooking of the countless consequences which comes from LI attention 
on intergovernmental decision-making; LI is seen as misleading in its false promise of 
integration.  Finally, there is a belief that LI does not empirically correspond in its hypothesis, 
resulting in questions left unanswered, particularly on its responsibility to follow through in 
confirmation and limitations.74 
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 While these criticisms may have some standing, they mainly appear to be overstated 
and are open to being deconstructed.  To begin with, LI is a theory of intergovernmental 
decision-making under anarchy.75  Essentially, LI’s inherent theoretical claim is not that the 
“producer interests prevail” or “economics dominates policy”, but rather that it is state 
preferences concerning how to manage globalization.76  Recent empirical research makes the 
case that LI theory actually applies widely encompassing every-day decision making.  
However, this does not allude to LI having the capacity to explain everything, and it does not 
mean that institutions do not matter, for example, various entities such as the EU in regards to 
central banking, supernational adjudication, and competition policy.77  The claims concerning 
LI being unable to foresee negative consequences, even after entering ‘rational grand bargains,’ 
can be acknowledged in two parts.  The first is when faced with an unavoidable shift, such as 
a change in government and policy.  The second is supernational organizations that will try and 
build up their influence, which will in turn become an inevitable process of limiting 
governments.  An ancillary factor that should also be kept in mind is with the negotiation of 
treaties, which are ultimately ‘incomplete contracts’ in that they are subject to revisions and 
diluting,78 potentiating further unpredictability.   
 Although these criticisms are valid and true to an extent, it can equally be argued that 
they are the result of over-analysis.  LI does not clearly shy away from these issues, and 
comfortably accommodates their existence within its framework.  Similarly, and the reason for 
institutional involvement in decision making is precisely to elaborate on agreements and to 
credibly assure compliance against future unsatisfied governments, therefore the above 
arguments require further substantiating to be held as genuinely limiting factors.79  In fact, LI 
makes the case that there is suitable evidence supporting that state preference functions 
concerning integration have more often than not been stable.80   
 It is clear that governments, in general, can predict potential policy consequences and 
are aware of their actions.  What is important to note is that LI explains integration under most 
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conditions, but not under those which go against its assumptions about preferences, bargaining, 
and credible commitments.81  While the scope of the theory is defined by its assumptions, LI 
also explains policy-making where social preferences are relatively certain and well defined.82  
The variance of outcomes should be correlated with the underlying uncertainty in the 
circumstances being analyzed, and the most stable areas are economic preferences, where they 
are deemed reliably predictable, particularly in agriculture and trade.83  In this way, countries 
can be seen to manage consistent preference functions for decades, including being able to shift 
in response to changing market conditions and even sudden policy failures.84   
 Importantly, when national preferences involve large and predictable downside risks, 
we observe the construction of international institutions that maintain national interests, for 
example, in agriculture, the member states are national ministers and restrict the role of the 
European Parliament and employ voting rules to maintain tighter control.85  Less predictable 
are national preferences in economic areas such as monetary policy, where economic 
knowledge is more uncertain.86  
 Another important aspect is that, unless there are instances of high transaction costs 
from influential supranational entrepreneurs, intergovernmental bargaining based on 
asymmetrical interdependence dominates interstate bargaining.87  Bargaining, negotiation, and 
international regimes predict that open and non-coercive negotiations will be more efficient 
when information is broadly available and it is only when governments are not able to access 
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3.2.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Arctic  
To refocus what was outlined above, LI has the ability to anticipate domestic, economic, and 
state interests, which governments then use to develop a common Arctic policy.  Therefore, 
this concept demonstrates how policy creation is an example of a form of intergovernmental 
bargaining.  From this summation, three propositions can be drawn in terms of governance 
systems and intergovernmentalism as it pertains to the Arctic region: Firstly, that Arctic policy 
(from Canada and Russia) is determined based on economic pressures from domestic actors 
and institutions; secondly, that the Arctic policies are designed to promote Canada and Russia’s 
geopolitical interests; lastly, that Canada and Russia as asymmetrical states can be predicted to 
shape their Arctic policies around a common theme of cooperation based on interdependence 
and interstate bargaining. 
 
3.3.1 Postcolonialism Theory 
Postcolonialism explores the impact of colonial and imperial histories, and their legacies, 
particularly drawing attention to how colonial influence had a hand in shaping societies, 
governments, and people’s ways of thinking.89  One could be forgiven for assuming the ‘post’ 
in postcolonialism suggests that the effects of colonialism had somehow been eradicated, yet 
it is a theory which is interested in raising awareness around the different and valid perspectives 
in readings of history, and offers a relevant perspective on current events that were influenced 
by the significant fallout of declining colonialism, the retreat of colonial powers, and the 
emergence of new states born of a synthesis of old ideas and new.  Chiefly, it deals with the 
“disparities in global power and wealth accumulation and why some states and groups exercise 
so much power over others” as a central theme, one which is important for analyzing how the 
Arctic and its communities were affected historically and those impacts we still feel today.90 
 In terms of the historical foundations of the theory, Young91 outlines three fields in 
which postcolonial theory can be illustrated: 1) humanitarian (moral), 2) liberal (political) and 
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3) economic.92  To summarize, humanitarians/economists viewed anti-colonial campaigns in 
terms of morality, while in contrast, politicians, specifically liberals, made the case for 
unrestrained and morally dubious colonial expansion as a way to ‘civilize’ heathens.  The credit 
for the very first anti-colonial campaign is to Bishop Bartolomé Las Casas (1484-1566) of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Spain in 1542.93  Historians maintain that 50 years after Christopher 
Columbus ‘found’ the “new world” in 1492, Las Casas “questioned the moral and legal 
grounds of the Spanish occupation of America.”94  In this regard, Las Casas’ campaign to 
recognize the “full humanity of the Indians” and condemn the conquistador invasion as “social 
sins,” resulted in Casa being dubbed the inventor of twentieth century Latin American 
liberation theology.95 
 In IR, postcolonialism focuses on analyzing how discourses and concepts of power, the 
state, and security, are used to enforce the status quo and frame understanding and thinking 
about the world.  Postcolonialism primarily offers a unique perspective that is not found in 
traditional theories, such as the concept of sovereignty or culture with the creation of the state 
which were “imposed on the colonial world by European powers.96” 
 
3.3.2  Economic Justification 
Regarding its economic justification, postcolonialism details a world order that is dominated 
by major state actors and their interests which shape world views.  IR realist and neo-realist 
strands of scholarship are not interested in questions of culture and culturally derived notions 
of what counts as morality.  Since states simply exist, and by their nature pursue their interests, 
or else are pressed to do so by the systems of anarchy, the rules that govern state interaction 
are not seen to have anything to do with culture.97 
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 Historically, the Americas’ natural resources and the allocation of gold and silver was 
an influence on the growth and success of capitalism in Europe, and that lucrative element from 
the colonies created “captive colonial markets”, which in turn guided Europe’s relations with 
the world outside Europe.98  Running concurrently with this appropriation of the Americas’ 
resources, was the emergence of the ‘Westphalian System’ in response to the Thirty Years’ 
War, which made concrete the territorial integrity of sovereign states, and their colonial 
territories and imperial aspirations were solidified, as their overseas territories were treated as 
extensions of the state itself.  In effect, however, rather than granting colonial nations equality 
and sovereignty, it was in in fact merely a means of developing commercial enterprise and 
exporting European governance and organizational systems in a process of enforced 
acculturation.99 
 In truth, the extraction of wealth and pillaging of land and colonies at the expense of 
the inhabits culture are as relevant today as they were in the past.  In analysing Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations (1776), Young notes that contrary to popular belief, colonies are not a result 
of good planning and policy, but in fact the result of European colonialist greed creating a 
systematic disorder and injustice.100  Postcolonialism’s utility then is evident when challenging 
ingrained beliefs that states behave and the hierarchical international order which has emerged 
from this power and sense of historical entitlement.  Not only does it offer an analysis of 
injustices and oppressions deeply rooted in history, but also answers as to why certain cultures 
and societies are not thriving, and what that means to those states which govern them. 
 
3.3.3 Postcolonialism History 
Historically, the Arctic is regarded as one of the few regions in the world that has such 
expansive issues of defined sovereignty, and thusly colonialism in this area is more obscure.  
Viking longboats are depicted reaching the shores of Iceland, Greenland, and beyond, long 
before the classical age of discoveries credited to the likes of Columbus, Cabral, da Gama and 
their ilk; though undoubtedly this latter period marked the unity in thinking between 
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“colonialism, modernity, and capitalism.”101  European colonialism during the first and second 
ages of modernity mobilized local resources, and local populations, into colonial 
administrations that shared many features with the systems of the colonizers; the Arctic falls 
similarly within this description. 
 Making Arctic colonialism distinct, however, was the unusual scale of reliance on local 
communities to maintain over-stretched and under-resourced colonial administrators, who 
struggled particularly owing to their poor supply links and fractured connections to major cities 
in their homelands.102  By contrast with other colonial settlements, the relative isolation of 
Arctic outposts necessitated a deep involvement in the concerns of local indigenous 
populations, with the proximity of colonial subjects uncharacteristic of the broader colonial 
era.103  So sporadically scattered were the various Arctic settlements, that they defy 
generalizations which encompass the wider colonial situation at the time.104  Indeed, given the 
complexities of such settlements, wider conceptions of both colonialism and postcolonialism 
are superseded by indigenous histories and the realities contemporaneous to the colonial Arctic 
at large, all of which are a direct result of the vast distances between these imperial outlands 
and the metropolitan bases of colonial powers, with Jensen reminding that “such a colonial 
matrix also produces postcolonial specificities.”105 
 
3.3.4 Criticisms of Postcolonialism 
Postcolonialism has withstood and undergone extensive criticisms and critiques from many 
theorists across a wide range of fields of study (literary, political, religious).106  Many note that 
postcolonial theory is ‘ambiguous, ironic and superstitious,’107 with Jacoby arguing how 
postcolonial theory is problematic for researchers because of its “lack of consensus and 
clarity.”108  This lack of clarity, together with its fluidity and ambivalence, is considered a vital 
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flaw, as the term is not only without an agreed-upon fixed definition, but also keeps changing 
through “new forms of social collectivity” as they emerge over time and space in a postcolonial 
world.109  Therefore, it is difficult to keep pace with the rapidly changing world while at the 
same time keeping the definition (if any) of postcolonial theory intact. 
 In attempting to pin down a more concrete definition, theorists appear to have struggled 
with the evolution of thought within society in relation to the fixed reference point of a shared 
history, especially as there are such rapidly evolving values and interpretations of it.  
Addressing the respective controversy surrounding the prefix ‘post’ in this compound noun, 
Slemon concedes it is a “vexed areas of debate within the field of postcolonial theory”, while 
Moore stated that ‘post’ implying after-colonial is “naïve, inadequate, or utopian” at best.110  
Slemon sees it as coming into being as a facet of imperialism, “a concept that is itself predicated 
within large theories of global politics and which changes radically according to the specifics 
of those larger theories.”111  With this in mind, it is as such that it will be regarded throughout 
the remainder of the paper, cognisant that it is an imperfect lens clouded by other theories. 
 
3.3.5  Postcolonialism in the Arctic 
There would be little controversy if the Arctic region were described as a collection of systems 
that promote the contemporary neoliberal order.112  Arguably, it consists of many sub-Arctic 
nation-states, to which postcolonial theory can be applied as a methodology to investigate the 
limitations and unexplored interests of the Arctic.  Analyzing how agency works for Arctic 
peoples, definitions of sovereignty, and conceptualizing the Arctic as a region through the 
prism of Canada and Russia’s Arctic populations, opens the way to an assessment of the 
impacts of governance and the negative effects of Eurocentric approaches to the Arctic.  As 
postcolonialism challenges set boundaries, it is useful as an interdisciplinary approach to 
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encompass how political, economic, cultural freedoms, and environment are currently 
intertwined with past colonialist systems.113 
 Even between Postcolonialism’s pioneer theorists such as Ashcroft, Tiffin, Griffiths, 
Bhabha, and Spivak, very few scholars have analyzed or acknowledged the Arctic region to 
the extent that it merits.114  Therefore, postcolonialism is under-represented in the Arctic, 
implying that colonial analysis from other parts of the world can still be used as a similar 
method of comparison in regards to history and power structures.  In this way, it can be argued 
that the postcolonial prism can be used to dissect how the Arctic has “historically been 
constructed to serve the imperial interests of states that have imposed their sovereignty on the 
Arctic (Canada, the US, Russia, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden.)”115  Other 
contingent factors of self-determination and political agency for Arctic peoples must also be in 
context of environmental threats from resource extractions, which risk their livelihood in terms 
of food (hunting/ fishing) and clean water/air conditions.116  Although these Arctic peoples live 
on a metaphorical goldmine, their rights are disregarded and, in fact, they receive very little 
benefit from these treasures.  While the Arctic is a vast region, this study will be limited to 
including only the Canadian and Russian Arctic regions, as to explore beyond this would be 
beyond the scope of the paper.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
To summarise, the criticisms that human security is too broad and insubstantial a concept have 
been explored, yet in contrast to this, it can be seen as having informed both Russia and 
Canada’s most recent policies (see section 5).  Its importance in providing a foundation for 
regional cooperation has been outlined, typified by the centrality of the Arctic Council to 
protecting environmental and social aspects of the region.  As an evidence-based policymaking 
research process, it still offers considerable benefits to regional populations.  Though said to 
be symptomatic of constitutional and legal frameworks imposed by the state, its holistic 
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approach offers solutions which particularly benefit those in the arctic previously most 
neglected. 
 Between LI and Postcolonial theory, a double-edged sword is demonstrated, in that the 
prevalence of self-governing rational individuals and private institutions are empowered, and 
able to lobby and influence states for the benefit of regional citizens, and yet, many of those 
private institutions benefitted from the exploitative elements of colonialism, thus creating 
systemic injustice, inequity and disorder.  The cementing of such hierarchies means that states 
are disproportionately affected through their reliance on LI, by private sector institutions which 
benefited most from colonialism.  While LI cooperation is rational, and enables greater 
statecraft and diplomacy between Canada and Russia, postcolonialism theory still provides the 
additional caveat whereby Canada’s colonial past may impact on policy and still benefit a 
historical dominant strata of society rather than indigenous and regional Arctic populations. 
 
4: A Historical Overview 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Both exploring and providing a historical overview of Russian and Canadian history as it 
pertains to territorial governance, particularly concerning indigenous rights, this chapter will 
go on to outline domestic governance structures and internal challenges faced.  Finally, a 
summary will be provided of Russo-Canadian cooperation, detailing their mutual interests and 
objectives. 
 
4.1.1 A Historical Governance Overview of The Arctic 
As mentioned in chapter one concerning theoretical frameworks, existing IR conceptions of 
sovereignty, state authority, and security are the basis of most analysis and focus when 
considering governance, relations, and environmental cooperation in the Arctic, which some 
authorities on postcolonialism would argue lead to neglecting the perspectives of indigenous 




cultures, beliefs, and knowledge are connected to the Arctic’s ecosystem, and are impacted by 
climate change.117  Because of this real and present danger, indigenous political participation 
is vital.  The case can be made that indigenous leadership has assisted in creating the Arctic’s 
“unique cross-cultural and political system, which has strong aspects of collectivity, integration 
with the ecosystem, and responsibility, rather than simply state security and power.”118 
 Detailing how identifying the importance of Arctic indigenous oral history is to 
research, Allemann and Dudeck119 demonstrate how it serves to pass down values through 
generations, wherein their appreciation for the land and a deep sense of responsibility for 
ensuring the environment does not come to harm run throughout.  For example, as Cruikshank 
explains, in indigenous traditions and beliefs about glaciers, there is a weight on “human 
agency, choice, responsibility, as well as the consequence of human behaviours.”120   The case 
can be made from a postcolonial standpoint, that in order to delve into the behaviours and 
motivations of state and non-state actors in the Arctic regions, IR would be wise to incorporate 
knowledge systems that are based in a particular social, political, and historical environment.  
This example will benefit IR as it can highlight collaborative, cooperative, and innovative 
political systems in cross-Arctic relations, where this broader environmental respect could be 
utilised to create new bonds with indigenous peoples. 
 
4.2 Russia 
Historically, Russians are recognized as the first European explorers and inhabitants of the 
Arctic, which is reflected in the figures as half of the Arctic population live in the Russian 
territories.121  Therefore, Russia has an extensive historical presence developing northern 
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territories, with Lagutina highlighting that the AZRF covers the largest part of the Arctic 
territory as the AZRF’s territory stretches over 3.1 million square kilometers, accounting for 
18% of Russia’s territory;122 and 20 thousand kilometers of the national border of the Russian 
Federation passes through the Arctic region.  The largest number of the Arctic population lives 
in the AZRF, with approximately 2.5 million people live in the AZRF which is roughly half of 
the Arctic’s entire population.123  Extremely rich with resources, the AZRF has great transit 
and military provisions, meaning it is considered one of the most important drivers of 
strengthening the economic and geopolitical positions of the country.  Unsurprisingly, Russia 
is actively developing the economy of the Arctic territories: 10 % of Russia’s GDP and 20% 
of Russia’s exports are currently produced in the Arctic.124  Thus, for Russia, the Arctic is not 
some distant territory with a harsh climate and difficult living conditions, but a fully integrated 
part of the state territory, the governance of which is an essential component of modern 
Russia’s policy.125  
 
4.2.1 A Paradigm Shift in Arctic Governance History 
In terms of historic changes in Russian Arctic state governance, there are four main stages of 
Russia’s presence in the Arctic: the initial period, the imperial period, the Soviet period and 
the present stage.126  Lagutina notes how “chronologically, Russian Arctic actions evolve from 
the initial disorganised and spontaneous economic activities, to later reactive and unsystematic 
explorations, and finally to systemic and strategical military, academic and industrial 
presence.”127  When the Soviet Union collapsed and until the 2000s, the Kremlin disregarded 
the Northern Arctic.128  As was referenced in human security theory, the end of the Cold War 
created a less military centered focus for Moscow, and the Artic region ceased to be a zone of 
potential confrontation.129  It is noted that in the Yeltsin era, the lucrative aspects of the North 
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was overlooked and in the 1990s, and Russia's northern territories were considered by the 
federal government to be a “burden or source of various socio-economic problems rather than 
an economically promising region.”130  This resulted in a chain of events where the far northern 
regions were almost “abandoned by Moscow and had to rely on themselves (or foreign 
humanitarian assistance) in terms of survival.”131   
 However, the difficult conditions started to change and improve in the early 2000s when 
the Putin government and its new agenda came into power, resulting in general socio-economic 
improvement in Russia.132  As a result of the increased governmental interest, Russia thusly 
became one of the first Arctic states to develop its northern strategy, as on June 14, 2001, the 
Russian Cabinet approved a draft document titled "Foundations of the State Policy of the 
Russian Federation in the Arctic" (Government of the Russian Federation 2001) which outlined 
Russia's national interests and main strategies in the Arctic.133  On September 18, 2008, 
President Medvedev approved the Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation 
in the Arctic to 2020 and Beyond (Medvedev 2008). The six-page document enumerated 
Russian national interests in the region: developing the resources of the Arctic; turning the 
NSR into a unified national transport corridor and line of communication.134  
 
4.2.2 Russian Government Structure 
Due to this renewed refocussing on the Russian Arctic by the Kremlin, Arctic policy-making 
received a significant boost, resulting in a highly centralised process.135  In terms of Russian 
governance structures, this is best outlined by Sergunin and Konyshev in “Forging Russia’s 
Arctic Strategy: Actors and Decision-Making” wherein they reason that although the sub-
national and non-state actors obtained some role in shaping Moscow’s Arctic policies in the 
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post-Soviet era, the “centre of the decision-making system firmly remains in the Kremlin and 
the executive agencies”.136  
 Of the ministerial departments and governmental agencies which have responsibility 
over the continued socio-economic, environmental and cultural development of the AZRF, 
most notable would be the Ministry of Economic Development, which in coordination with a 
number of state organs, oversaw the 2014 State Programme for the region.137  The 
implementation of industrial policy in the region is principally overseen by the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, while gas, oil and mining falls under the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment (MNRE), along with the balancing of environmental issues facing the 
ecology of the AZRF.138  Regarding relations surrounding human security, The Federal Agency 
for Ethnic Affairs manages relations with indigenous peoples of the Russian North.139  As far 
as the logistical considerations for the region are concerned, the Ministry of Transport, via the 
NSR, oversees navigation along this vital shipping lane, and in collaboration with the 
Department of State Policy on Maritime and River Transport, and the Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping, form the main governing body which implements the International 
Maritime Organization’s Polar Code (2014-2015).140  Yet problematizing the balance between 
government departments charged with handling shipping and transit in the region, was a power 
struggle over control of the NSR, which between 2016-2018 saw infighting between them 
break out over the perceived mismanagement of the NSR, and failing to adopt an appropriate 
Arctic Transportation System, with NSR Administration head Dmitry Smirnov even being 
arrested on corruption charges.141  Clearly, such bureaucratic quagmires hamper efforts to meet 
the unique challenges of the region ahead of its most crucial era in IR.  
 In terms of external threats to Russia, its Security Council is comprised of the heads of 
its various agencies and ministries, answering to the chair of the security council, the 
President.142  Given its members, it functions as another key body for establishing Arctic 
policy, with the Council setting the agenda for both domestic and foreign policy alike, outlining 
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core interests, underscoring threats and securing the country’s military, economic and social 
information.143  In its advisory capacity to the President, it highlights internal and external 
policy matters, while contributing to presidential decrees on issues national security, with 
documents of strategic significance being vetted, debated and revised before being signed off 
by the President.  That said, those analysts closest to the Kremlin suggest that it is in fact the 
Presidential Administration which actually takes the lead in coordinating Russia’s arctic policy, 
in lieu of the Arctic Commission or Security council themselves.144  In effect, with the 
Presidential Administration overlapping in so many functions with the security council, with it 
also drafting presidential documents and legislative positions, forwarding candidates for key 
positions within government, it could be argued that it supersedes the Security Council in many 
regards. 
 Complicating matters further, Serguinin and Konyshev explain how it is common 
practice for there to be an appointed special envoy to handle issues of greater international 
import, selected by the Kremlin specifically for the task, who answer directly to the president 
and, by default, his administration.145  A case in point would be the appointment of Arthur 
Chiliingarov as Special Envoy for Arctic and Antarctic Affairs, much to the chagrin of the 
Foreign Ministry, who already had a representative dealing with the Arctic Council and 
BEAC.146  Indeed, such inter-departmental rivalries and a culture of competition within 
government can only impact negatively on Arctic governance, not in the least as a first point 
of contact as an arctic liaison is not clear with such levels of bureaucratic abstraction – as 
Sergunin and Konyshev point out, this runs counter to Putin’s spirit of greater centralization.147 
 Add to this the Federal Assembly, which, after collaborating with foreign parliaments 
and international organisations such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament 
etc., actually has less ability to directly influence policy, and has its power diluted considerably 
by the aforementioned state and non-state actors than, for example, the U.S. Congress.148  That 
said, the executive branch, and Arctic policy makers in general, are still more effective when 
party controls the assembly which is fully behind the president.  An example of this, would be 
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how legislative initiatives in the Arctic are certain to have support when Putin’s own party, 
‘United Russia’, are in control of the State Duma and the Council of the Federation, even if 
opposition parties are able to make amendments, which underlines how parliament does 
possess the institutional framework necessary for generating and administering Arctic policy 
itself.149  Indeed, there is a special Committee on Regional Policy, Northern and Far Eastern 
Affairs set up by the Duma, which in certain cases, alongside other committees, can be involved 
in legislative matters in the Arctic, providing additional oversight.  Similarly, the Council of 
the Federation has a counterpart institutional structure, with the Committee on Federalism, 
Regional Policy, Municipal Administration and Northern Affairs, which is also charged with 
managing issues arising in the AZRF, further complicating the jurisdictional overlap.150 
 Composed of regional members of the Russian Federation and its municipalities, at the 
sub-national level of government.151  At the return to a Russian federal system, however, many 
sub-national units became active once more in shaping domestic and foreign policies on the 
Arctic and beyond, through the development of international contacts (paradiplomacy) as a 
means of pressuring the federal centre to trade their loyalty to Moscow for regional allowances 
and concessions.152  Acting across regional lines and resolving various municipal interests 
throughout the AZRF, there is a shared responsibility of problem solving, via lobbying in 
broader contexts to achieve shared aims, with regional administrators even partaking in federal 
decision-making processes to the extent that their voices are heard before final decisions being 
made.  A prime example cited by experts on the region would be the Murmansk region being 
involved in preparing international agreements which directly affected it (the outlining of 
maritime borders, establishment of customs regimes, visa regimes and the like).153  What is 
more, state-oriented bi-national matters often grow to becoming transnational issues, owing to 
the proximity to the EU, which shapes paradiplomacy across the sub-national units of the 
Russian Arctic.  This speaks to a growing trend of sub-national matters becoming oriented 
around Europe, with regional actors influenced by the EU financially, along with other related 
funds, largely on account of previously closed off, peripheral regions of Russia now being 
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be conceptualised in two ways, as direct (developing their own external relations), and as 
indirect (influencing federal foreign policy).  Ultimately, it is the more general devolution of 
power in Russia since 1990 that has enabled Arctic sub-national units to conduct their own 
foreign relations, allowing them to develop into legitimate international actors.   
 
4.2.3 Recent Changes in Russian Governance Systems 
More recently, there were important changes in the Russian decision-making system on the 
Arctic, with Lagutina154 citing the example of the 12-year Arctic policy of Russia, which saw 
the creation of the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic in 2015, and in 2019 
the Arctic issues were included in the competence of the Ministry for the Development of the 
Far East.  The State Commission is described as a “deliberative body, which coordinates 
activities of federal executive bodies, executive organs of the constituents of the Russian 
Federation, public bodies, organs of local self-government, and organizations to handle 
socioeconomic and other problems concerning national security and the development of the 
AZRF.”155  It is noted that the Commission had major changes in approval of the power of the 
federal authorities. Lagutina explains how this was created to include business and civil society 
in the Commission’s work, basically, the State Commission has been transformed “from a 
broad policy network to a more traditional state-dominated structure.”156   
 Further complicating the jurisdictional overlap at the state level in the Arctic, an attempt 
to answer calls for a dedicated decision-making ministry for the AZRF resulted in, after 
successive postponements, an attempt by Prime Minister Medvedev to attach the region to the 
Ministry for the Development of the Far East.157  As Lagutina points out,158 however, this 
integration of these two vital regions to Russia’s economic future still treats the Arctic as 
subordinate, with the Far East still taking precedent,159 leaving the question of a region specific 
body for the AZRF unanswered.  The absence of regulatory documentation dealing with the 
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region as distinct allows for administrative boundaries and corporate obligations to limit the 
creation of a more coordinated state policy.160  
Ambitions set around the NSR, icebreakers, rescue fleets, and infrastructure 
improvements on land and sea remain unachieved,161 with them subsequently making up 
aspects of the latest Arctic strategy for 2035.  Much of these delays are credited with being the 
result of underfunding, sanctions against Russian and foreign the oil and gas companies in the 
Arctic.162 
 Energy giants internationally are noted by Lagutina as agreeing to deals with local 
communities to account for the interests and needs of their communities,163 with federal law 
being accepted that marks the Russian Arctic as a special economic zone with preferential tax 
rates and wider reaching perks for businesses to incentivise their further investment in the 
region.164  Of benefit to both the region and national economic targets, Russian natural 
resources bolster Russia’s position at the top table of IR globally, and channeling global 
markets into the AZRF will only serve to further benefit regional development. 
 Because of the economic importance of the Arctic for Russia, it is socioeconomic 
development that is still one of the main priorities of Russia’s Arctic policy.  This is limited 
and difficult, however, as is explained by Lagutina, because the Russian Arctic’s economy has 
specifically difficult factors to overcome, such as: a “harsh climate, poor transportation, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, low labor mobility, etc.”165  The Russian Arctic is deemed 
mostly as “underpopulated region with industrial hubs unevenly distributed across it and with 
a commodities economy.”166  Despite these challenging conditions, the AZRF’s industrial 
region is counted as being the most solid among the Arctic regions of Arctic nations.  To get a 
better idea of the scale of economic activity in the region, the AZRF’s economy produces 
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roughly “70% of the GDP of the entire Arctic zone and produces more than 20% of exports 
(gas, oil, non-ferrous metals, fish).”167  
 More recent Arctic developments can be seen with Russia’s Arctic policies. As 
Lagutina highlights, it was the introduction of a new development model for Russia’s Arctic, 
and this creation of ‘pillar zones’ (‘opornye zony’) that became a “cluster approach” designed 
to the “specifics of the Russian Arctic.”168  Thusly, it was through these ‘pillar zone’ projects 
that a plan was created to “ensure a comprehensive development of the Arctic territories for 
the purpose of achieving Russia’s strategic goals in the Arctic utilizing in a well-coordinated 
manner the entire range of functioning instruments and mechanisms of state support.”169  There 
are currently 8 pillar zones in 8 constituent entities of the AZRF,170 and this was used in order 
to transition from the “‘sectoral’ to the ‘territorial’ principle of the development of Russia’s 
Arctic.”171  In essence, it is economic based wealth of natural resources that remains AZRF’s 
main competitive advantage and drive for future development of the Arctic, which will 
hopefully benefit Arctic communities by extension.  Not only this, but the Russian Arctic’s 
territorial advantage could be argued to strengthen Russia’s “geopolitical standing in the world 
community and facilitates its full-scale integration into global markets.”172 
 
4.3 Canada 
It is arguable that the history of Canadian territorial governance, and its link to indigenous 
peoples, is a central aspect of past and contemporary Canadian identity and Arctic policies.  
Canada’s North is a vast region made up of, “three territories, encompassing 75 percent of the 
country’s national coastlines and 40 percent of its total land mass.”173  Although Canada’s 
North is sparsely populated, the region is spotted with vibrant communities, many inhabited by 
Canada’s Indigenous populations. The Canadian Arctic has a smaller population, however 
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these communities and the North are a very close integral part of Canada’s identity and 
history.174  Economically speaking, the Canada Arctic hosts substantial “natural resources, 
industries, and growing tourism.”175 
Territorially significant, in Canada’s North, the Northwest Territories (NWT) was 
established in 1870, and the Yukon was created in 1898,176 with the gold rush pushing the 
federal government to remove land from the NWT in order to solidify the profits from the 
Klondike Gold Rush177.  This led to the Canadian government dismantling the NWT until it 
was “down to a third of its original land mass by 1905,”178 and as a result, as is explained by 
Tully, “internal colonization”179 was inflicted upon indigenous peoples and their territories, as 
the Canadian government had been using and governing without their permission.  In a process 
that feeds into the postcolonial elements of Canadian history, it is clear that the “appropriation 
of land, resources and jurisdiction, not for the sake of resettlement and exploitation, but for the 
territorial foundation of the dominant society.”180   The long-term effects described by Tully 
describe a community that was in the past, causing “economically self-sufficient and 
interdependent societies” to be turned into overcrowded reserves which “led to welfare 
dependency, high levels of unemployment, poor health, low life expectance, high levels of 
infant mortality.”181 
 In another shift of interest in the Arctic that had been largely ignored, at the end of 
WWII the Canadian government’s attention was directed to the north as it needed to claim 
sovereignty and create economic opportunities in the region.182  Similar to the Arctic paradigm 
shift in Russia around the mid-1960s/70s, there was an increase in pressure from indigenous 
peoples to attain local autonomy in the north, resulting in a series of court cases.183  This led to 
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the Supreme Court installing the rights of Aboriginal peoples in section 35 of the Constitution 
Act of 1982 and under liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1973 land claims of the Yukon 
were agreed upon.184  The Northwest Territories agreed to the division and established Nunavut 
in 1999, with a jurisdiction of 85% Inuit.185  In the 1980s, these agreements and treaties incited 
sweeping changes in the north such as the “infusion of capital, removal of the Indian Act as a 
governing document over indigenous peoples in much of the north, royalties from future 
resource developments, new government structures and enhanced financial opportunities and 
responsibilities.”186 
 
4.3.1 Canada’s Governance in its Northern Territories and Indigenous Peoples  
For a basic governmental structure outline, on Canada’s government website, there are three 
branches that work together to govern Canada:  The executive, legislative and judicial 
branches187:  The executive branch (also called the Government) is the decision-making 
branch, made up of the Monarch (represented by the Governor General), the Prime Minister, 
and the Cabinet.  The legislative branch is the law-making branch, made up of the appointed 
Senate and the elected House of Commons.  The judicial branch is a series of independent 
courts that interpret the laws passed by the other two branches.  Parliament itself is made up of 
the following three parts: the Monarch, the Senate and the House of Commons.  Canada is a 
constitutional monarchy, which means that the Queen or King is recognized as the Head of 
State, while the Prime Minister is the Head of Government. 
 In Canada’s northern territories, there are three groups of indigenous peoples mentioned 
in section 35 of the constitution: First Nations (Indians), Metis and Inuit.188  Another distinctive 
aspect of the country is that Canada is a multinational state consisting of three distinct groups: 
the English, French, and Aboriginal peoples.  Although Canada is a federal state whose power 
is divided between the national government, the provinces and the territories, it is important to 
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understand that the northern territories are seen as a part of the federal chain and are delegated 
certain powers which is overseen by the Parliament of Canada.189  Consequently, this system 
caused incredible issues for nation building for Canada’s North, due to the lack of a long-term 
strategy for “northern development and political incorporation of the region.”190   
 To illustrate further, as the Canadian government focused mainly on resource extraction 
and sovereignty rights, the Canadian north subsequently fell into a problem of being 
underdeveloped in terms of: “road systems, community infrastructure, technology, health care, 
housing quality and education facilities.”191  This lack of foresight, consideration, and a limited 
colonialist mentality, could be argued to have contributed to the dysfunction, alienation, and 
poor conditions which greatly hindered the overall nation building process in Canada’s North.   
 Following this sentiment, the Progressive Conservative government instituted the 
Roads to Resources program 1957-1963,192 which pursued the building of transportation 
infrastructure aimed at exploiting natural resources.  It was in this transition period where 
Northern Canada became synonymous with untapped potential, with the solution being the 
construction of infrastructure to access these resources.   
 
4.3.2. The Aftermath: Environmental and Cultural Crisis in Canada’s North 
In Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, Higginbotham and Spence highlight that this data 
and review of developments since the 1980s, leading to a conclusion that although the scores 
for indigenous communities improved over time in terms of well-being, there was a sharp and 
widening gap between non-Aboriginal communities.193  Essentially, they argue that these 
statistics prove that these northern communities are not enjoying the general advancements and 
high quality of life in Canada.  One main issue is the devolution accords which occurred during 
the time Nunavut was born, where the rights and authority given was actually a result of great 
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limitations.  This is due to the rules of resource development and revenues, not including 
offshore land, and also the revenues which are capped for the territories, ultimately leaving 
them with “a smaller share than the funds available to the provinces, with the federal 
government of Canada remaining an active player in the north.”194 Another factor is that even 
though there is a smaller population and tax base, these territories still have to supply the same 
public services, only over much vaster distances, which is complicated further by competing 
public service providers at the federal, municipal, territorial and indigenous levels, with little 
jurisdictional clarity available. 
 In order to fix some of these problems raised above, it would likely fall to the federal 
government which had “imposed an unsustainable economic system upon the Canadian North, 
stripping away the traditional economy through policies of settlement and dependence in the 
first half of the twentieth century, and restricting the resource economy.”195  Consequently, the 
outcome that can be seen is a northern economic development paradigm in the Canadian North 
that is systematically flawed and has been stuck for 50 years, ultimately stemming from a state 
needing government assistance, along with the effects of the Diefenbaker and Berger 
doctrines.196  On top of this, even the noted political gains in terms of devolution and self-
governance, in reality, very little has progressed in terms of economic self-sufficiency.  
 Today, it is evident that Canada seeks to be in a leadership role in circumpolar affairs, 
particularly while also advancing domestic priorities of social and economic development, 
environmental protection, greater scientific and traditional Indigenous knowledge, and cultural 
diversity.197   How Canada faces its northern challenges and aspirations will be explored in 
further detail when analyzing Canada’s latest 2019 Northern Strategy in chapter three.  
 The effects of climate change in Canada are extremely large within its Arctic region. 
For example, some parts of Hudson Bay have lost more than 90% of their sea ice in the past 
30 years.  Consequently, the Northwest Passage, has become more navigable, and this has 
raised issues of security and international environmental regulations.  It is not only sea ice that 
has diminished significantly in recent years, but also ‘glaciers, ice caps, and the freeze-up of 
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rivers, lakes, and marshes.’198  Since about 70% of Canada’s coastline is located within the 
Arctic Circle, there are many settlements of Inuit and other indigenous communities in the 
coastal area.  The habitable areas are undergoing severe deterioration as a result of permafrost 
thawing and coastal erosion, and the government is exploring adaptive measures that include 
infrastructure development. Given these circumstances, Arctic marine research is particularly 
important for Canada. Therefore, Canada has implemented a variety of initiatives in this area 
that include operating a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker specializing in scientific research.199 
 To this end, in 1997, Canada’s Oceans Act established the national maritime 
jurisdictions and listed three basic principles of management strategy: sustainable 
development, integrated management, and precautionary approaches.  Canada drew up the 
Oceans Action Plan in 2005 and is promoting integrated ocean management under the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada.200  Most notably, five large Ocean Management 
Areas were established.  For example, the Regional Coordination Committee, with both the 
federal and local governments, and the Beaufort Sea Partnership, included local stakeholders, 
created an integrated management plan that was made to determine ecologically and 
biologically important areas.   Thusly, Canada made a plan to “establish Marine Protected 
Areas (MPAs) 14 from 10% of its coastal and ocean areas by 2020, in line with the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).” 
 
4.4 History of Canadian and Russian Cooperation 
There are noted relevant historical links and cooperative relations between Canada and Russia 
which indicate a potential future cooperative possibility. The first historic agreement was 
signed by Alexander Yakovlev in 1984, the Soviet Canadian protocol on scientific and 
technical cooperation in the arctic was a landmark first step for improved Russo-Canadian 
circumpolar relations.201 
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 Since this point, the heart of contemporary Russo-Canadian relations has been based 
around a succession of economic agreements, the first of which being the Agreement on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1991), the Agreement on Trade and 
Commercial Relations (1992), the Agreement on Economic Cooperation (1993), and the 
Agreement on Double Taxation (1995), which established a legal basis of mutual benefit 
between the two nations.202  Also in 1995, a Russian-Canadian Intergovernmental Economic 
Commission was established, with the structure of the IEC consisting of a subcommittee on 
agriculture, and a working group on construction, fuel and energy, mining, and greater 
cooperation in the Arctic and the North.  In terms of security, and equally important, were the 
1998 agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, and the 2000 
agreement on Air Services and principles of Basic Cooperation between the Russian Federation 
and the provinces of Canada.203   
 Of the bilateral agreements directly relating to Arctic affairs, on December 18th, 2000, 
a joint Russo-Canadian policy came into being based around bilateral cooperation in the Arctic 
North. In October 2005, the Canadian-Russian Business Council (CRBC) was created, which 
included a working group on agriculture, mining, energy, information and telecommunications 
technology, transport, finance, forest industry, which also plays a role in Arctic affairs.  
Moreover, in November 2007, during a state visit to Canada, arrangements were made across 
9 branches of industry, for Russian-Canadian Arctic cooperation on agriculture, fisheries, 
veterinary and phytosanitary controls, along with a host of new financial agreements.204    All 
of which adds up to a robust network of non-state actors influencing issues of trade and 
commerce in the circumpolar north. 
 
4.4.1 The Arctic Council 
The designing of Arctic governance was founded on the idea that the main role of the Arctic 
Council was to promote “cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states.”205   
This stems from the 1990s, which was signified by the end of the cold war, and the easing in 
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tension in the Arctic region.206  The Arctic Council has succeeded well with, international 
cooperation, and environmental issues, since its establishment in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration 
on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.207  In terms of the structure, the Arctic Council’s 
leadership is explained to be on a two year rotating chairmanship between the eight member 
states, made up of six working groups, which are given tasks for specific Arctic initiatives.208  
Additionally, permanent participant status has been given to six indigenous people’s 
organizations (the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the 
Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council).  
 Canada and Russia both collaborate on the Arctic Council, cooperating in Working 
Groups.  The accomplishments within the Arctic Council in this regard are stated as:209 
• The Arctic Council regularly produces comprehensive, cutting-edge environmental, 
ecological and social assessments through its Working Groups.   
• The Council has also provided a forum for the negotiation of three important legally 
binding agreements among the eight Arctic States.1 
• Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic (2011) 
• Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic (2013) 
• Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017) 210 
 
4.4.2 Canada in the Arctic Council 
Canada considers itself a leading Arctic state, and a core element of its multilateral approach 
to the region is the Arctic Council, which has emerged as a significant component of Canada’s 
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of the Arctic Council from 1996 to 1998, and again from 2013-2015.  Canada’s primary 
priorities related to the Arctic include addressing socio-economic and cultural development, 
environmental protection and climate change, and strengthening relations with Indigenous 
peoples.”211  
 During Canada’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council, its goals were primarily to seek 
development for the Arctic region to the benefit of Northern peoples, including raising mental 
health awareness in those communities, to integrate indigenous knowledge into the functions 
of the Arctic Council, and to improve environmental protections to reduce fossil fuel impact 
on the region as a whole. 
 Of its main successes, the founding of the Arctic Economic Council as an additional 
forum for regional cooperation was chief amongst the progress made under Canadian 
stewardship, with it functioning as an independent forum for business-to-business cooperation.  
Moreover, Canada made a significant contribution to the development of an action plan to 
prevent oil pollution, and reduce carbon and methane omissions.  Also worthy of note, it 
assisted in the establishment of the open-access archive project to ease the public’s accessibility 
to the work of the Arctic Council, raising its profile further internationally. 
 
4.4.3 Russia in the Arctic Council 
In terms of multilateral level of Arctic cooperation, Russia sees the Arctic Council as “a key 
regional association coordinating international activities in the region.”212  One important piece 
of information is, Russia has never declined to cooperate with its Arctic neighbours or within 
the Arctic Council.  It was the Soviet Union who began talks for Arctic cooperation which has 
been documented in Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on October 1st 1987.  In this 
speech he championed a nuclear-free zone and reducing military activity in an attempt to ‘build 
trust, collaborate in developing natural resources, coordinating scientific research, cooperating 
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in the sphere of environmental protection and opening the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to foreign 
vessels.’213 
This is noteworthy as in 2021, Iceland will hand over the chairmanship of the Arctic 
Council (AC) to Russia.  Lagutina outlines that, the Ambassador at Large of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, who is responsible for international Arctic cooperation, Nikolay Korchunov, 
asserts that Russia’s second chairmanship of the AC will be “a comprehensive inclusive 
approach to responsible governance”, based on harmonious equality of all aspects of 
sustainable development.214  Falling in alignment with the objectives set out in the “Basic 
Principals – 2020 Strategy,” Russia’s chairmanship of the AC will centre around its socio-
economic agenda, factoring in the human security dimension that appears integral to 
international Arctic cooperation.  Generally speaking, the issues the AC face are argued to be 
connected with the priorities in Russia’s state policy in the region. 
Joint projects between the state, corporations, and in indigenous peoples are proposed, 
with a separate block dedicated to indigenous issues specifically, namely with a view to holding 
a summit of Arctic peoples to demonstrate Russian progress in this area.  Moreover, cross-
border cooperation and inter-regional interaction is being prepared by the Ministry for the 
Development of the Far East, promoting joint projects between the regions of Arctic states.  In 
this spirit of cooperation, greater international scientific development and joint research has 
been proposed for the Russian Arctic, with new circumpolar initiatives and projects tabled.  
Environmental protections are also high on the agenda, with the goal of developing a circular 
economy around combating climate change and turning back cumulative environmental 
damage. 
  Interestingly, youth involvement is also earmarked for greater consideration in Arctic 
cooperation, with the digitization of telecoms, a rise in distance learning, greater educational 
programmes planned for indigenous youth, and action taken to decrease inequality in Arctic 
regions.  Biosafety and combatting viral infections in the light of COVID-19 will also play a 
significant role, strengthening interstate cooperation in ways previously underutilised. 
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 Over the last several years, Russia has taken an active part in drafting three international 
treaties on Search and Rescue, Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, and Enhancing 
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation under the auspices of the Arctic Council (all of 
which have now entered into legal force) and in crafting an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated 
High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean which, after lengthy and tough negotiations, 
was finally adopted and opened for signature in 2018. 
In recent updates, the Russian Arctic Council presidential program which was recently 
published on the Council’s website where Moscow tries to reflect the human security agenda 
in the entire Arctic, not only in the AZRF.  A cross-cutting priority of the Russian 
Chairmanship in the Arctic Council will be “Responsible Governance for Sustainable Arctic” 
through promoting collective approaches to the sustainable development of the Arctic, 
environmentally, socially and economically balanced, enhancing synergy and cooperation and 
coordination with other regional structures, as well as implementation of the Council's Strategic 
Plan, while respecting the rule of law.  More will be discussed in chapter 5 on this matter. 
 
4.4.4 Scientific Research Cooperation 
Since the Soviet era in 1979, Canada and Russia have and continue to have a long history of 
Arctic cooperation.  From the 1979215 search and rescue agreements, to business and scientific 
research projects, to the current day Arctic Council cooperation examples, Russia and Canada 
are seen to work together.  As both countries follow, and have a history of following, 
international rules in the Arctic, it is in both of their interests to cooperate and see each other 
as neighbours who can help tackle the human security gaps and build Arctic governance 
structures that face their combined Arctic challenges presently, and in the future. Bridge 
through domestic governance.  
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Canadian and Russian Arctic cooperation has a long and storied history since the Soviet era, 
from 1979 search and rescue agreements, to scientific and business focussed initiatives, but 
best typified in the unprecedented levels of cooperation in the Arctic Council; ultimately, 
Russia and Canada are continuing a rich tradition of working collaboratively.  At the heart of 
contemporary cooperation, it is clear that the succession of existing economic agreements will 
be vital to maintaining diplomacy, particularly as the modernization of the AZRF and the NSR 
will act as a trade stimulus for the Arctic region as a whole. 
 While the indigenous political participation has been shown to be vital for 
collectiveness and harmony with the broader ecosystem, providing a framework for more 
environmentally concerned governance, neither Russia or Canada have taken steps to devolve 
power more directly to their regional administrators, yet it could be argued that IR would 
benefit from drawing on such diversity and regional knowledge systems which offer socio-
political and historical advantages in terms of local governance, and contribute to the more 
holistic approach desired. 
 
5. Qualitative Research and Case Study 
 
This chapter will compare and analyze Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework 
(2019) and Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and 
Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035, looking first at the positives and 
negatives of these policies, before analyzing them in terms of the 7 human security dimensions.  
 
5.1 Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) 
Carolyn Bennett, Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations, outlined Canada’s Arctic and 
Northern Policy Framework in 2016,216 which “sets out a long-term, strategic vision that will 
 





guide the Government of Canada’s activities and investments in the Arctic to 2030 and beyond 
and will better align Canada’s national and international policy objectives with the priorities of 
Indigenous peoples and Arctic and Northern residents.”217 
In summary, the framework is communicated to the public in simple steps.  Firstly, in 
2016, Trudeau sought to co-develop a policy framework, incorporating peoples from across 
the Arctic region, factoring in both Territorial and Provincial governments and Indigenous 
Peoples and Northerners alike, with it replacing Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009) and the 
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010).218  Such unprecedented collaboration 
with the six territorial/provincial governments and Indigenous representatives helped to 
establish a roadmap for future co-development in the interests of the Arctic as a whole.219  The 
scope of recognition for Arctic communities is best summarized as the renewal of ‘Inuit-to-
Crown, nation-to-nation, and government-to-government relationships’, which is underlined 
by the 2019 Budget, which put forward a host of new measures, alongside more than $700 
million in support for the initiative.220  Of the improved measures, funding was made available 
to enhance infrastructure in the region, bringing peoples in the remote Arctic into closer contact 
with urban centres, providing support for cleaner energy production, diversifying 
further/higher education, alongside increasing the programme for economic development, 
enabling vital Arctic research to take place, all with a view to promoting Canada as a leader 
from the front on global Arctic affairs.221  In sum, the key areas of focus are: 
1. Generating comprehensive Arctic infrastructure 
2. Strengthening Arctic peoples and communities 
3. Ensuring strong, sustainable and diversified Arctic economies 
4. Promoting Arctic science and Indigenous knowledge 
5. Protecting the environment and preserving Arctic biodiversity 
6. Providing global Arctic leadership 
7. Providing safety, security, and defence 
 
 
217 Ibid.  
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid.  





 Expounding upon the Canadian policy on the Polar Connection: Home of Polar 
Research and Policy Initiative website, Chater outlines how Canada’s new policy 
emphasises eight pillars.222  Notably northerners are directly mentioned in three pillars:223 
1. Strong, sustainable, diversified and inclusive local and regional economies 
2. Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples are resilient and healthy 
3. The Canadian Arctic and North and its people are safe, secure and well-defended 
4. Strengthened infrastructure that closes gaps with other regions of Canada 
5. The rules-based international order in the Arctic responds effectively to new 
challenges and opportunities 
6. Knowledge and understanding guides decision-making 
7. Canadian Arctic and Northern ecosystems are healthy and resilient 
8. Reconciliation supports self-determination and nurtures mutually-respectful 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples 
 Essentially, this has signalled a dramatic change of ideology compared with Canada’s 
previous 2009 Arctic policy, which had four pillars that emphasized northerners less,224 
promoting the far more nebulous targets of “Exercising Our Arctic Sovereignty, Promoting 
Social and Economic Development, Protecting our Environmental Heritage, and Improving 
and Devolving Northern Governance.”225 
 In addressing the environmental and societal challenges facing the Arctic, a bottom-up 
approach is necessitated by the uniquely diverse make up of these Northern peoples. 226  That 
said, any such approach requires further development for it to have any hope of making a 
significant contribution to an ever-changing political landscape globally.227  Environmentally, 
the adoption of goals from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change for reducing 
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carbon-based emissions has seen the integration of monitoring systems by the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme, guided by the Arctic Council.228  Komaki cautions 
that federal resources will be put to the test when it comes to implementing top-down 
protections to protect the Northwest Passage ecosystem, yet equally argues the profile of the 
region will be raised by such attempts at protection, further fuelling discussion on the topic, 
which may facilitate the achievement of environmental aims. 229 
 
5.1.1 Positive Aspects 
In Essence, the Trudeau government approach to Arctic strategy is decisively in contrast to the 
older conservative Harper government’s motto which was the “use it or lose it” Arctic strategy 
brand which informed the 2009 Arctic policy, as Byers highlights.230  The focus in the 2009 
policy231 was mainly all about strengthening military capabilities in the Arctic as a place under 
threat with sovereignty at risk.  The most noteworthy difference between the 2009 policy and 
the 2019 policy is the level of engagement and collaboration that is apparent.  A positive 
movement towards a human security approach, the Trudeau government invited “sub-national 
actors to contribute to the national Arctic vision, which has resulted in documents from the 
government of Nunavut and Northwest Territories, as well as a co-written chapter from the 
three territorial governments and a chapter from Canada’s major Inuit organisation, Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami.”232   This indicates a modern direction for the Liberal government, as they 
try to go in a different format in terms of investing more in the Arctic than previous 
governments.  Among its strengths, the strategy addresses the social and economic crisis in 
Arctic communities and encourages working with Inuit and First Nations leaders to deal with 
epidemic levels of suicide and tuberculosis, tangible issues that have real world impacts on 
Canadians lives, rather than focussing on unrealized military developments of little human 
security benefit.  
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 Another significant distinction between the 2019 policy and the 2009 one is that, 
although there are references to Arctic sovereignty, it is more minimized in importance.233  
Framed as being for greater representation and participation of northern Canadians that will 
follow the “rules based international order in the Arctic,”234 the 2019 document marks a 
significant shift in consideration when it comes to Canada’s Arctic militarization, as these will 
now be through the prism of dialogue with northern Canadians, taking into account climate 
change threats.  Along the same theme, the 2019 policy calls for a de-escalating of Arctic 
tensions, and emphasises the importance of cooperation.  There is a call to have open 
communication and dialogue with Russia in the Arctic, stating that Canada, “will take steps to 
restart a regular bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues with Russia in key areas related to 
Indigenous issues, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, shipping and search and 
rescue.”235 
 
5.1.2 Negative Aspects 
For background purposes, Canada’s last domestic northern strategy was issued in 2009 by the 
Harper Conservatives, and its Arctic foreign policy in 2010.  With broad support in parliament, 
the Liberal government announced their intention to create a new Arctic strategy in 2016, with 
their new vision released some two and a half years later.  Byers asserts that it is likely the 
Trudeau government fell into the trap of “trying to consult everyone in concerning the 
north”236, which is reflected in the title, as it is not the Arctic policy framework, but the northern 
policy framework which invited more and more stakeholders to be included.  It could be argued 
that the strategy becomes so large and confusing as a result of the scale and diversity of input 
included, though equally, such aspirations of inclusivity are a bonus, and a typically Canadian 
trait.  However, the problem arises as a lack of coherence, with condensing needed to ensure 
the policy is actionable and focussed, with Byers cautioning that there may be an issue with 
the Trudeau government running out of time to implement it.   
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 What is more, another issue is that the strategy is not a single document, but is a 
collaboration of chapters written by separate people, which can result in both its aims being 
diffuse and its messaging unclear.  For example: Global affairs Canada wrote one chapter, then 
Department of National Defence, with no apparent connection between the two, followed by 
other chapters by the three territorial governments and national Inuit organizations.  It is an 
ensemble of separate chapters, each reflecting diverse input, interests and recommendations, 
which equates to very little coherency.  There still remains hope, however, that the government 
will assimilate the gathered information and take charge, generating coherent actionable 
policies.  A case in point, in terms of actionable policies, would be the money being put forward 
in addressing and helping Arctic communities, however, there still is not an overarching 
framework and vision beyond this comprehensive mission statement, a hallmark perhaps of 
Anglo-North American approaches to policy and business.  Ultimately, the question remains 
as to how such improvements will be achieved in a 3-year, 10-year, or even 20-year timescale.  
 
5.2 Russia’s Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone (2035) 
Regarding Russia’s latest policy, the Strategy for Development of the Russian Arctic Zone 
outlines the role of the region in the country’s socio-economic development and national 
security.  It specifies aims and tasks of Arctic zone development, implementation stages, 
expected results, as well as main mechanisms for strategy implementation.  Implementation of 
this Strategy is scheduled for three stages: the first stage (2020 - 2024), the second stage (2025 
- 2030) and the third stage (2031 - 2035).  The provisions of the document will be provided by 
amending the state “Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation” program, regional state programs, as well as by implementing measures of the 
Northern Sea Route infrastructure development plan. 
 A summary of the Russian state policy in the Arctic up to 2035 expands the list of basic 
national interests in the region, seeking greater resources for economic development, looking 
to secure peace and cooperation in the Arctic zone, while simultaneously accommodating 
environmental concerns, securing the northern sea route, and safeguarding national 
sovereignty.  The renewed focus on security pursues the twin goals of improving human 
security for Northerners by assuring higher standards of living, while maintaining traditional 




 Equally evident, is a noted shift in Russian domestic politics, with the underlining of 
the importance in economic and population growth in the North.  The main messages of the 
documents are that a peaceful solution will be sought on Arctic issues based in international 
law and good will, that good neighbouring relations among Arctic states are vital, that support 
for the Arctic Council (AC) is essential as joint forum, and that this will be achieved while 
protecting the interests of indigenous peoples and the environment.  Crucially, greater 
economic collaboration between the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) will be 
pursued with both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, foreshadowing less regional isolation when 
it comes to trade. 
 Building on this, the new strategy of development and national security up to 2035 
details further goals, with the Russian chairmanship of the AC (2021-2023) high on the agenda, 
as Russia seeks also to play a more active role on the Arctic Economic Council.  Not only will 
further regional investment be invited from abroad, but improved scientific and educational 
cooperation will also be targeted.  Aside from more active participation state actors and NGOs 
on international forums, a unified search and rescue system will provide more tangible support 
to inhabitants of the circumpolar North. 
 Perhaps the boldest maneuvers planned in the longer term, are the considerable goals 
for social and economic development in a 15 year timeframe, not in the least as the targets are 
geographically specific, with precise figures projected, suggesting a considerable level of 
planning.  For example, life expectancy is intended to rise from 73 to 82 years of age, 8 nuclear 
ice breakers are tabled to be built, including three world-leading class of vessel, 200 thousand 
jobs are set to be created, along with a rise in regional GDP contribution of around 2.5%.  More 
specifically, pertaining to the maritime Arctic trade route, cargo shipments are projected to 
increase from 32 million tons to 130 million tons, alongside liquified natural gas production 
being set to rise from around 9 million tons to 91 million tons.  Such specificity in these longer-
term goals imply a sizable commitment to their pursuit and attainment which contrasts 
considerably with the more nebulous Canadian policy ambitions, which should allow for a 
more careful analysis of policy successes or failures come the end of this policy period.   
 When compared with the respectively limited ambitions of the 2008 to 2020 policy, 
though some would argue it is continuity and evolution rather than revolution,237 there are still 
 





marked improvements.  The previously vague remit of using the Arctic as a strategic resource 
for the rest of the country, maintaining peace and cooperation, preserving ecology and utilising 
the Northern Sea Route, it is plain to see that the 2021-2035 policy is a more comprehensive 
proposal which signals a more liberal intergovernmentalism approach to the Arctic’s future. 
 The Russian Arctic Council presidential program 2021-2023 recently published on the 
Council’s website highlights how Moscow will try to reflect the human security agenda in the 
entire Arctic, not only in the AZRF.  To summarize the areas prioritized for multilateral 
cooperation, there are 4 distinct areas:238 
 Firstly, on the inclusion of indigenous peoples from the Arctic, the sustainable 
development targets centre around human capital being central, with sustainability being key 
across climate and individual well-being, education and health, and the promotion of scientific 
and cultural exchanges, tourism, and the protection of linguistic and cultural heritages for 
Northern peoples. 239 
 Secondly, in terms of broader environmental protections for the Arctic as a whole, 
combatting climate change in line with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement are central to 
a low-emission economy target, with ecosystems and biodiversity being preserved, the 
mitigation of existing climate damage towards a more ecologically balanced circumpolar 
North, and the pursuit of renewable energy all being key. 240 
 As far as socio-economic development is concerned, the Russian chairmanship 
continues along its theme of sustainability, targeting economic growth that upholds the 
priorities of indigenous communities, namely in promoting reliable energy infrastructure, 
sustainable transport, improving shipping, developing communication systems, and 
streamlining investment flow for business. 241 
 Lastly, raising the profile of the Arctic Council as a leading forum for international 
cooperation in the region, the Russian chairmanship will seek to further promote Working and 
Expert groups, the effectiveness of the Secretariat, as well as boosting financing for Council 
activities.  Alongside funding projects and programmes, it will look to encourage dialogue with 
 







AC observers in engagement with the AC.  Collaboration between the AC and the Arctic 
Economic Council, Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and the University of the Arctic, will all be 
marked for intensification during the Russian stewardship of the AC, with the further 
promotion of international scientific cooperation, including AC expeditions in the Arctic 
Council. 
 
5.2.1 Positive Aspects 
Particularly in socio-economic areas, the 2035 policy has a variety of positive and forward-
thinking goals and objectives.  Of direct benefit to AZRF inhabitants, improved medical 
facilities and equipment will provide a significant boost to the primary healthcare system, with 
more vehicles available, and an international rescue system addressing the precarity of living 
in such isolated regions.242  Greater engagement with the scientific community at large, and 
providing STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths) education for Arctic citizens, 
along with improving legal regulations to create better conditions for training of indigenous 
peoples, will improve the outlook for youth in the region and perhaps counter the brain drain 
intrinsic with more remote regions of developed countries.243  Such boosts to professional and 
educational organisations not only benefit research, but have the subsequent effect of boosting 
elements within the real economy in a trickle-down process of raising professional 
competencies and standards.244  The impact on youth populations cannot be understated 
however, with creative and sports development support being provided, alongside improved 
air fare subsidies, state support for housing, all building on the STEM funding and greater 
environmental protections, creating a more fertile environment for emerging talent and 
potential community leaders. 
 That the Russian Arctic strategy will be implemented in three stages: first stage (2020—
2024), second stage (2025—2030), and third stage (2031—2035), also provides opportunities 
for progress checks and the assessment of any shortfalls or target failings, allowing for 
corrections to be made.  This is a well-thought-out and detailed outline that aims to ensure that 
targets are attained, as amendments will be “introduced to the Socioeconomic Development of 
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the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation State Programme and the regional state 
programmes.”245  Compared to the 2008-2020 Arctic policy, the new 2035 document is 
different in that for the first time, the main pillars of the development of the Arctic zone policy 
are centered around improving the quality of life of Russian Arctic populations and a focus on 
social development.   
 In terms of military measures, these are noted as being mainly of a defensive nature, 
focussing on the prevention of threats towards Russia in the region.  However, the key 
messages regarding the documents are that peaceful resolutions will be the first port of call in 
dealing with emerging conflictual relations, with the AC being a vital organ of the diplomatic 
process of maintaining peace. 
 At the heart of the 2035 strategy for Development of the Russian Arctic Zone, domestic 
priorities are emphasized, with one of the driving forces in the policy being the building of a 
“comprehensive development of the infrastructure of seaports, and shipping routes in the 
waters of the Northern Sea Route, the Barents, White and Pechora Seas.”246  Similarly, the 
policy highlights the serious threats of climate change which create challenges in the Arctic 
and issues for Arctic populations, which had previously been referenced, but with too little 
action taken.  Therefore, priorities of its 2021-2023 Chairmanship are around ‘sustainable 
development of the Arctic’ and promoting programs that assist and reinforce the cultural 
heritage of indigenous peoples.”247  As Buchanan explains, the Strategy for Development is an 
illustration of how important Russia is taking its Council chairmanship.248   
 
5.2.2 Negative Aspects 
Although the 2008-2020 Russian Arctic policy established the goal of fixing the regional 
disparities and issues which afflict Russian Arctic indigenous communities, in reality, as was 
discussed in sections 3 and 4, there remain present and continuous population decreases in 
almost all areas of the Russian Arctic due to the difficult quality of life in the region.  Therefore, 
the question remains with the new 2035 Arctic policy, as to how much of this funding will this 
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affect Russian Arctic indigenous lives and communities in a meaningful way.  As Russia is 
already the biggest population in the Arctic, would increasing the population be worthwhile in 
terms of health and economic conditions, particularly given how some Russian experts249 make 
the case that other Arctic countries with smaller populations (Canada and Norway) use the fly-
in/fly-out method for their regional labour, as it is the most logical and cost-effective choice.250  
 Another factor in the 2035 policy is that there is a continuing focus of ensuring 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as one of the main interests in the Russian Arctic region.  
As Russia increases military and hard security dimensions, this indicates a contradiction to the 
human security elements in the policy.  By the federal center throwing more funding and 
resources behind hard security as a key aspect of the 2035 policy is detracting from the material 
improvements to quality of life which will benefit the region most, despite the human security 
benefits tabled.  There is very little expectation of armed conflict in the Arctic region, 
particularly as it is territorially owned by western powers, and as the world is in the nuclear 
age, it suggests this is as much about power projection as it is actual security. 
 Despite the emphasis on the socio-economic benefits of the 2035 policy in developing 
the Arctic, there appears to be confusion how this will be implemented.  In order for there to 
be long-term results, there would likely need to be an organized and cohesive administration 
that breaks away from gridlock bureaucracies focused on short-term gains.  While the long-
term targets provide a specific benchmark against which to measure success, it could equally 
be argued the timescale for their resolution is such, that few in key government positions will 
still be incumbent in 2035.  The point here being that there will likely be little accountability 
for any failings when this policy period has reached its conclusion.  Indeed, it seems that only 
time will tell in this regard. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Having compared and analyzed Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) and 
the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring 
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National Security for the Period up to 2035, it is evident that they echo one another in a number 
of ways.  In terms of the progressiveness of their policy proposals, particularly regarding 
environmental security, and the importance of safeguarding Northern communities across the 
Arctic, these policy decisions are a marked improvement on the outdated policies they 
replaced.  Despite the unifying factor of the Arctic Council, the power of corporations and 
resource-hungry companies do still threaten to undermine the political good will created by 
such collaboration, and could hamper both nations in achieving their environmental goals. 
 Indicative of the binding power of common legal frameworks internationally, there is 
similar alignment in this regard between the two policies, in spite of their differing visions for 
the region’s future.  While Russian priorities clearly lie in the NSR, and Canadian interests are 
more broad, and less reliant on the Northwest Passage, there is a shared direction in policy 
which is suggestive of improving relations going forward. 
 Regardless of being embroiled in other disputes internationally, the governance and 
legal frameworks afforded by non-state forums such as the Arctic Council, along with shared 
stances on the rights of domestic regional peoples, on economic affairs, and environmental 
concerns, there is ample cause for optimism in the circumpolar North.  Though both nations 
will likely maintain different stances on coastal borders and maritime claims, particularly 
concerning military defence, there is the potential for an unprecedented age of positive Russo-
Canadian relations elsewhere in the world, if the Arctic can be prioritised and used as a 




Human security offers a more nuanced understanding of security and threats by bringing the 
focus away from the state and towards the individual, community, and environment.  The 
comparative analysis of Russia and Canada’s Arctic strategies is based on the policy strategies 
outlined in the previous chapters, with the structure following the 7 human security dimensions 
raised throughout this paper, those of: 1) economic security, 2) food security, 3) health security, 
4) environmental security, 5) personal security, 6) community security, 7) political security.  




of these standards, a short summary is first provided, before a deeper analysis of the Arctic 
strategies in terms of correlating them to the 7 human security dimensions, and with one 
another. 
 
6.1 Economic Security 
Economic security is defined as “a guaranteed basic income for people, in terms of work, or 
providing a publicly financed safety net,”251 and is a crucial issue in the Russian and Canadian 
Arctic zones, and Arctic communities, to quite extreme levels compared with the rest of the 
country.  As unemployment and poverty are particularly damaging issues which perpetuate the 
region’s quality of life failings, it is important to see how each policy proposes to tackle these 
obstacles in their approach to domestic-economic security. 
 Generally speaking, there are several similarities based on common factors, such as 
having similarly disproportionate economic/employment opportunities in the Arctic in 
comparison with the rest of Russia and Canada respectively.  As has been explored, Canada’s 
2019 Northern Policy and Russia’s 2035 Strategy both revolve around recognising domestic 
socio-economic problems and creating methods to solve them.  For example, Canada’s 2019 
policy heavily addresses the social and economic crisis in Arctic communities, and encourages 
working with Inuit and First Nations leaders for the first time, and the Canadian federal 
government has collaborated with Indigenous representatives, and six territorial and provincial 
governments, to define and co-develop an economic framework which considers the priorities 
and perspectives of Arctic and Northern people.  The budget to tackles these economic based 
goals sets aside more than $700 million to support the Framework, complementing existing 
efforts to strengthen Arctic and northern communities.  This includes new funding to diversify 
post-secondary educational options in the territories, enhance infrastructure resources to 
connect Northern and remote communities, increase economic development programming.  
 In terms of economic initiatives, the Russian Arctic 2035 strategy has multiple far-
reaching steps centred around economic and social development for the next 15 years, detailing 
how the Arctic share in Russian GDP is purported to grow from 7.2 to 9.6 per cent and the 
creation of 200.000 new jobs.  There will be a guarantee of improved living standards and 
 




prosperity for people of the Russian Arctic zone, and through this, it will develop the Russian 
Arctic as a strategic resource base and speed up national economic growth.  One of the main 
arguments in the policy is that building a “comprehensive development of the infrastructure of 
seaports, and shipping routes in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, the Barents, White and 
Pechora Seas” will directly bring more economic prosperity to the Arctic regions.   
 In terms of how these policies differ, the Canadian 2019 policy may by considered more 
focused on incorporating indigenous voices into real economic goals, even at the expense of 
non-state interest groups and other governmental priorities.  Comparatively, though the 
Russian 2035 strategy mentions plans to guarantee certain standards of living, there is still a 
large focus on shipping routes rather than a concise inclusion of indigenous participation in 
economic frameworks, which ties into the broader concern of a lack of direct representation 
for regional communities in policy strategizing. 
 
6.2 Food Security 
Summarized by the statement “people at all times have the right to physical and economic 
access to basic food,”252 the UN claims that the solution to food insecurity is related to 
economic security (access to steady work and a sufficient income).  For food insecurity, the 
main message is that the problem is not limited food, but an issue of organization in distribution 
along with purchasing power.  Intrinsically linked to the economic security, one of the 
criticisms is that Arctic communities are overly dependent on the rest of the country, given 
how agriculturally limited the Arctic regions are.  This is a similar issue for Canada and Russia, 
as both of their Arctic communities suffer from high food costs (i.e.: transportation/shipping 
costs) and suffer disproportionately during economic downturns.  In terms of greater food 
accessibility, there are plans for both Canada and Russia to attempt opening up this market.  
For example, Russia has grand plans to improve its maritime trade routes and shipping port 
development, as noted in Strategy 2035, there are goals to develop the Russian Arctic as a 
strategic resource base and catalyst to speed up national economic growth.  The development 
of the Northern Sea Route as a globally competitive national transport corridor will be that 
link, with shipping routes in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, the Barents, White and 
 




Pechora Seas.  Allowing greater infrastructure development in the Arctic region will open up 
trade and prosperity for the region, thus allowing for more food and economic security.  
Whether these trade options will translate to more prosperity for the Arctic communities 
themselves is yet to be seen, though the federal center would likely benefit more directly. 
 Canada’s 2019 Strategy’s $700 million budget framework includes efforts to strengthen 
Arctic communities, enhance infrastructure resources to connect Northern and remote 
communities, and to increase economic development programming.  Although there is a 
mission to connect the gaps between Northern communities and the rest of Canada, it is unclear 
how exactly this will be executed.  There is also a lack of focus on building ports and sea routes 
for trade, or clear measures to allow more autonomy for the Indigenous economy and resources 
to grow.   
 In conclusion, Canada and Russia share a similar vision in their latest Arctic strategies 
in focusing on bridging the gaps between circumpolar communities and the rest of the 
countries, funding frameworks and projects which are hoped to build up Arctic infrastructure 
and a closer link with trade.  Hopefully these measures will result in food security for all Arctic 
peoples in the Canadian and Russian Arctic north. 
 
6.3: Health Security 
Health security is defined as a necessity to guarantee protection from diseases and major health 
risks.  “Threats to health security are deemed a larger problem for people in poverty, 
particularly children which is corelated to ‘malnutrition and insufficient access to health 
services, clean water and other basic necessities.”253 
 A large issue in both Canadian and Russian Arctic regions, health security issues are 
manifest in a definite lack of access to health services, clean water, and basic necessities.  
However, positively, both the 2019 and 2035 policies tackle these heath security issues in their 
own way.  With Canada’s 2019 policy, closely collaborating with a network of northern 
communities and representatives, offering a more substantial focus on heath insecurity which 
the Canadian North faces.  There is a push for the Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous 
 




peoples to be resilient and healthy, and this will be in the form of funding programs, 
infrastructure, schools, and health services.  Similarly, in the Russian 2035 policy, health 
security is prioritised in the Arctic, with life expectancy aiming to rise from 73 to 82 years and 
healthcare making up one of the main tenets of the policy. 
 Both policies are equally limited in that the attainment of health and well-being targets 
are not solely related to dollar investments and good will, with a more holistic approach being 
required, particularly given the unique challenges to mental health such isolated communities 
give rise to.  In this regard, the extent to which these policy commitments are acted on will not 
singularly be responsible for improving health security in the region, and a broader range of 
indicators would be required for a judgement to be made closer to the policies reaching their 
respective resolutions. 
 In conclusion, while both Canada and Russia emphasize the importance of addressing 
the extreme health insecurity in the Arctic regions which are facing high amounts of early death 
rates compared to the majority, further assessment will be required at a later date across a much 
broader range of primary care and healthcare metrics. 
 
6.4: Environmental Security 
Environmental security is defined as an aim to protect individuals from man-made 
environmental threats which deteriorate the natural environment254.  This can be considered as 
not being able to access clean water, air pollution, and general environmental contamination 
which decreases lifestyle quality for people. 
 Both Canada’s 2019 and Russia’s 2035 policy name check environmental security 
throughout, showing its significance to their agendas.  In Canada’s 2019 policy, the $700 
million given to support the Northern Framework includes new funding to support clean energy 
production, enable critical Arctic research, and protect the environment while preserving Arctic 
biodiversity.  Similarly, Russia lists a plan to ‘protect the Arctic environment, development of 
science and technology, the primordial homeland and traditional way of life of the indigenous 
minorities in the Russian Arctic’ as a central theme in their policy.  Negatively, the focus on 
 




resource extractions such as Vostok Oil by Rosneft in the Taimyr region, with production of 
more than 100 million tons of top-quality oil by 2035, promises to be the largest single project 
in Russian history, which could create more risks in the Arctic’s fragile ecosystems.  As oil 
spills do not carry with them strong enough financial and legal consequences to act as 
deterrents, it is up to both Canadian and Russian governments to address these dangerous 
loopholes. 
 Crucially, in line with the aims of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, the 
Trudeau administration has implemented a moratorium on the issue of new oil and natural gas 
drilling contracts as of December 2016, bolstering the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework 
aims to boost the economy,255 with exploratory drilling under existing leases having been 
prohibited since July 2019.  Under CIRNA Canada, research programmes have been 
implemented to analyze and predict ocean conditions and obtain scientific data to better 
evaluate Arctic climate concerns, a case in point being the Beaufort Regional Strategic 
Environment Assessment programme.256 
 In conclusion, Canada and Russia have equally progressive policies in terms of 
environmental security compared to past policies, and strongly focus on the importance of a 
safe Arctic for northern communities and global communities which are all affected.  However, 
corporations and resource-based companies still wield great influence in both Canadian and 
Russian Arctic matters, yet the Arctic Council may be a uniting presence in achieving these 
environmental goals. 
 
6.5: Personal Security 
Personal security is summarised as people needing to be protected from physical violence from 
both the state, external states, violent individuals, and domestic abuse.  The majority of 
violence stems from crime statistically.257  Zeroing in on personal security as a main feature, 
both Canadian and Russian Arctic policies look to address the high crime rates and violence-
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related incidents (particularly human trafficking and other external threats) as a very relevant 
issue for the northern communities.   
 The Canadian 2019 policy focuses heavily on personal security as can be seen in several 
cases.  As their funding outlines a framework to tackle all of these issues, most notably 
investing in a comprehensive Arctic infrastructure, strong, sustainable and diversified Arctic 
economies, providing funding for Arctic science and Indigenous knowledge, protecting the 
environment and preserving Arctic biodiversity, and safety, security, and defence.  The above 
policy commitments contribute holistically to improving living standards, which in turn reduce 
the number of indigenous peoples and northern community members living in precarious 
circumstances, therefore potentially lowering the rates of crime. 
 In the Russian 2035 policy, there are similar tacit supports for personal security for the 
Russian Arctic communities, such as preserving the Arctic as a region of peace, with stable 
and mutually beneficial partnerships and a substantial military, guaranteeing high living 
standards and prosperity for people of the Russian Arctic zone, developing the Russian Arctic 
as a strategic resource base and use to speed up national economic growth, and developing the 
Northern Sea Route as a globally competitive national transport corridor.  Along with building 
safety, security and port infrastructure of the NSR, in bringing innovations, development of 
science and technology, including reaching 100 per cent families internet coverage, in health 
care, education and other social infrastructure. 
 In conclusion, both policies focus on increasing military presence as a deterrent, 
improving infrastructure, improving education, unified search and rescue plans and 
unemployment issues which should become catalysts to improved lifestyle conditions and 
safety in the northern Arctic.  
 
6.6: Community Security 
Best understood as a guarantee to protect people from loss of traditional culture and values, the 




vulnerability of the 300 million aboriginal people in 70 countries as they face a widening spiral 
of violence.258 
 Both the Canadian and Russian Arctic strategies cite as a priority the maintenance of 
Indigenous traditional culture and values.  Throughout the colonialist past, many Indigenous 
traditions have been lost and even suppressed due to dominant state interests which has resulted 
in dire conditions for indigenous Arctic communities.  As previously mentioned, Canada has 
always at the forefront of human security and Indigenous representation.  However, conditions 
remain bleak, which is why the 2019 Arctic policy aims to include indigenous representatives 
from the Arctic community to be included in future decision-making plans which directly affect 
their lives.  Equally, the Russian 2035 policy focuses on domestic solutions, maintaining that 
the preservation of Indigenous heritage and environment is a particular focus.  
 
6.7: Political Security 
Political security is defined as a guarantee of freedom of society and political expression being 
necessary, and a societal focus on maintaining basic human rights259.   
 In Canada’s 2019 strategy, there is an olive branch being extended towards the northern 
Arctic communities regarding more freedom and autonomy through having a greater voice and 
influence.  Through co-developing an Arctic Policy Framework with Northerners, Territorial 
and Provincial governments, and Indigenous Peoples, the Canadian federal government is 
making history by working collaboratively with Indigenous representatives that will forge a 
long-term vision. As this Framework was built with consideration of the priorities and 
perspectives of Arctic and Northern people, this will hopefully lead to a framework which 
supports the Government’s commitment to “renewing Inuit-to-Crown, nation-to-nation and 
government-to-government relationships and ensuring that Northerners’ needs are recognized, 
respected, and reflected.”260  Whether these groups will wield genuine political power is yet to 
be seen, especially as some can point to indigenous communities in Canada where their voices 
have been silenced or marginalised by land violations when it comes to pipelines and business 
 







interests that override autonomous land rights.261  As Christie notes, “What I see is a long 
history of the Canadian government doing its best to avoid acknowledging the existence of 
other systems of government... the Crown has itself acknowledged that the way it gets authority 
over territory is through the making of a treaty.262” 
 In Russia’s 2035 Development strategy, there is a lot of inclusive language and focus 
on legal rights for northern communities, particularly in how it calls for the ‘peaceful settlement 
of all potential problems in the Arctic on the basis of existing international law and good will’ 
and to ‘protect the Arctic environment, the primordial homeland and traditional way of life of 
the indigenous minorities in the Russian Arctic’.  However, there is much less inclusion of 
northern indigenous autonomy in regards to regional influence.  As there is limited agency and 
freedom based on the Russian governance systems, which require the processing of a multitude 
of competing state departments and hierarchical chambers of government before arriving at 
presidential advisers for consideration.  
 In conclusion, both Canada and Russia’s strategies highlight the need for northern 
indigenous inclusion in Arctic matters, in regards to the economy, environmental protects, and 
legal rights.  However, given both Russia and Canada’s history of disregarding indigenous 
interests and wishes, the future will tell if there is a meaningful difference in consideration and 
regional agency.   
 
6.8 Conclusion 
In view of the above, in the near future, the authorities are likely to be more preoccupied with 
domestic policy issues and the region’s internal problems. The most important thing to 
understanding the current Russian policy in the Arctic is that the AZRF development is 
amongst its highest national priorities.  For Russia, the Arctic is not some remote, hard-to-reach 
territory, but an actual part of the state territory, fully integrated into the socioeconomic and 
political systems of the Russian Federation. Thus, Russia has extremely important national 
interests in the Arctic: from ensuring Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to 
guaranteeing high living standards and prosperity for the population of the AZRF, to 
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protection of the Arctic environment, to develop the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource 
base, its economy and infrastructure (first of all, the NSR). Besides that, Russia sees the Arctic 
as a territory of peace and stable mutually beneficial partnership, both on bilateral and 
multilateral levels.263 
 Questions have been raised as to the status of the Northern Sea Route as regards its 
legality, with Canada and Russia both citing long-standing claims to their rights to govern their 
territory how they see fit, in line with rules at the national level around the Arctic maritime 
region.264  Virtually mirroring each other, Canadian and Russian positions legally are in line 
with the Law of the Sea Convention regarding straight baselines, and the doctrine around 
historic titles.265 
 Diverging somewhat in the extent to which they are pushing the development of the 
Northern Sea Route, with Russia bullish and Canada more conservative, beyond this, both 
governments share the same values and priorities when it comes to the Arctic seas, despite their 
differences in their vision of the region’s waters. 266  Both defend their costal rights and 
sovereign borders for national security, share priorities in terms of preserving marine 
ecosystems, and protect indigenous rights, while ensuring safe transit to the economic benefit 
of local peoples.267  Similarly, both nations respect the primacy of the rights of Arctic states in 
how they govern. 268  In fact, even in the face of disputes elsewhere globally, the AC has 
remained virtually unaffected by such tensions, with Arctic diplomacy and governance being 
ringfenced, with international lines of communication over the circumpolar North weathering 
each storm,269 with the region growing in significance to both the EU and China, not only due 
to environmental concerns, but the trade benefits to the international community at large. 270 
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 Arctic observers and non-Arctic actors with a vested interest in the region prospering, 
those looking to exploit its vast supply of natural resources, are equally turning their focus to 
the region, also to the benefit of both Canada and Russia.271  What is more, with Western 
sanctions (started in 2014) pushing Russia towards the exploration of new markets and revenue 
streams, this too has boosted the region, particularly through bringing China into the equation. 
272 
 That said, much of this renewed focus on the region can be attributed to a firm will in 
the international community to ensure there is a solid base upon which to build further reaching 
trade relations and to establish a foothold for improved regional co-governance, and such 
cooperation is bringing the Arctic onto the World stage.273  Yet, it must be remembered that 
with more stakeholders invested in the region, it also opens the door to new security challenges 
which may yet determine how the region develops, particularly owing to the proprietorial rights 
and borders between the Arctic nations.274  For Russia, the context of its chairmanship in the 
AC focuses on the environmental, social and economic problems of the region. However, the 
priorities of the Russia’s Chairmanship are closely connected with solving the internal 
problems of the AZRF, but at the same time Russia is interested in international cooperation in 
the Arctic on issues of mutual interest pertaining to the socioeconomic agenda.   
 
7. Conclusion 
Over the course of this paper, the broader contextual concerns have been stated.  The 
significance of Human security as a foundation for further cooperation is clear, the significance 
of non-state actors like the Arctic Council is beyond dispute, and the impact of human security 
on the most recent Arctic polices of Canada and Russian have been explored.  The long and 
well-established history of Russo-Canadian cooperation in the Arctic, in spite of mitigating 
international circumstances, has been reiterated, with policy calls for greater cooperation 
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trumping divergences around militarization and the utilisation of the NSR.  The mirroring 
across legal and social aspects, across science and technology investment and research 
collaboration, and around community safeguarding, show historically unparalleled policy 
alignment between Ottawa and Moscow. 
 That said, of the structural differences at the governance level, there are, however, 
factors on both sides which hinder the realisation of the positive forecasts made in the policy 
targets, centering around efficiency and pragmatics, and the achievability of the goals set.  
Indeed, on the Canadian side, one could argue that the vagueness and imprecision of the 
Trudeau government’s ambitions, coupled with the business interests of non-state actors (and 
their considerable lobbying power in Ottawa), could undermine the potential of Canadian goals 
to be realised.  Equally, as far as Russia is concerned, competitiveness between state entities, 
a lack of devolved authority to regional areas, and the absence of a clear figurehead or 
spokesperson representing the Russian Arctic as a whole in policy matters internationally, 
could equally compromise the attainment of Russia’s considerably more specific and well-
thought out targets. 
 While Russia, who have traditionally adopted more realist strategies to IR diplomacy, 
have adopted uncharacteristically LI oriented approaches to the Arctic to date, deserve 
recognition for further moving away from their typical vertical power structure in Arctic affairs 
towards a more human security oriented dimension.  The significance of Russia’s AC 
chairmanship, and the willingness to engage in patterns of diplomacy more often associated 
with their Arctic neighbours, shows the emphasis the Kremlin has placed on ensuring economic 
prosperity in this emerging trade node. 
 Though both nations have stopped short of allowing for greater regional autonomy in 
the Arctic at the decision making level, Russian openness to international trade into the often 
isolated AZRF, and the Canadian incorporation of Northern voices at the policy drafting stage, 
are indicative of more progressive approaches to indigenous inclusion, and their funding 
commitments, if upheld, should amount to better living standards across the Arctic.  Though 
some way off the Nordic countries in their treatment of indigenous peoples, the prognosis for 
the region is an overwhelmingly optimistic one.  Whether Canadian policy commitments to 
Northern peoples are merely rhetorical in nature, meant to placate, or whether or not Russian 
advances are purely motivated by economic gain, the way that they potentiate improved human 




objectives in the Arctic are mainly of an economic nature (such as controlling shipping lanes, 
oil and gas exploitation) keeping the region stable is in every country’s interest.  Therefore, it 
makes the most sense to focus on human security elements, as they are more pressing than 
military security.   
 Ultimately, the analysis of Russian and Canadian governance in terms of their latest 
Arctic policies allowed for a general conclusion that, as changes occur more rapidly due to 
global warming, there will be a great need to establish an improved governance framework.  
The findings of the policy comparison indicate that, although Canada and Russia emphasize 
and do address most of the 7 human security issues, the ability of cohesive domestic 
governance needs to be stabilized in order to fix the problems that did not get enough funding 
and attention in the previous Arctic policy implantation.  In conclusion, although there are 
tensions currently with Ukraine, it is likely that both Canada and Russia will be forced to 
cooperate to tackle human security issues together in the future, outside of the Arctic council.  
In official policy and in statements, the Russian and Canadian governments follow a path of 
continued peaceful and legal co-existence in the region, which offers a solid foundation of 
cooperation to build upon when needed going forward. 
 
7.2 Recommendations for Further Study 
Aside from securing relevant interviews to acquire more qualitative data, given the recent 
nature of both policies analysed, a more protracted study carried out over time could analyse 
at each stage the extent to which policy commitments have been met, appraising at the intervals 
set out in the Russian policy, at the end of the first stage in 2024, the second in 2030, and at 
the end of the third stage in 2035.  Given the absence of fixed points for policy renewal on the 
Canadian side, it would make sense to adopt the Russian timescale.  What is more, quantitative 
data would be advantageous, particularly around environmental markers, economic indicators, 
and around metrics of indigenous health, quality of life and standard of living.  Equally, a more 
in-depth look at Russia’s Arctic Council chairmanship could provide insights that project their 
future intentions for the Arctic outside of their policy framework. 
 Though outside the scope of this study, initially, an analysis of Canada’s relationship 
with America, and of Russia’s cooperation with China, were intended to be an aspect of this 




interaction between these power brokers are likely to impact the region greatly, not least owing 
to the convenience of the NSR as a route for Chinese trade into the world’s largest trading 
market, the European Union.  Similarly, as U.S. policy begins to preoccupy itself with Chinese 
growth, so to might there be implications for their near neighbour Canada, which could impact 
relations with Russia.  Similarly, sovereignty issues around maritime borders, not only around 
the arctic, but also in the South China Sea, could potentially spill over and negatively impact 
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